In December of 1945 the status of Soviet aviation had come under debate in the Party Central Committee. The Aviation Commissariat proposals debated at that time culminated in a comprehensive program to eliminate any lag in the field of aircraft design or research. In March of 1946 a party of senior aviation personalities, Yakovlev among them, visited Germany to assess first-hand what could be obtained there. By April 2, a long-range plan for the development of jet fighters was laid before Stalin.

The strategy for post war development of jet fighters was based on the rapid achievement of superior jet engine capability. Although the Soviets had some background in jet turbine design dating back to 1937, the work of its most experienced jet technician, Arkhip Lyulka, had been interrupted during the war. After working on an unheralded rocket aircraft project, Lyulka returned in 1942 to jet turbine work. By the end of the war he was bench testing an experimental engine of 1,543 pounds thrust and had initiated work on a 2,866 pounds thrust engine intended for flight testing. It was apparent, however, that these engines were behind the world standard and would require extensive development while German engines were already available. The Commissariat plan would allow attention to be given to advanced engine design while native designed aircraft would be based on engines of foreign derivation. Key to the strategy was the purchase of British Rolls Royce centrifugal compressor engines—the Nene and the Derwent. In reacting to this strategy, Stalin is said to have remarked, “Just what kind of fool would sell his own secrets!” Nevertheless, the Russians had had considerable experience with the British unclassified lists during the war and were aware that licenses for production of these engines were being sold in a number of countries. The successful attempt to purchase these engines would proceed.

The 1946 Plan addressed three stages of engine development with associated design activities:

(1) Transitional aircraft based on 1,800–2,000 pounds thrust German engines. This stage was nearing fruition as the YAK-15 and MiG-9 were already in preliminary testing.

(2) Combat capability based on British Nene and Derwent engines of 3,500–4,850 pounds thrust. A requirement for such aircraft would emerge concurrently with the plan. All four fighter design teams would submit prototypes which evolved to the MiG-15, the YAK-23, Su-II, and the La-15.

(3) Advanced aircraft based on engines by Klimov, Mikhulin, and Lyulka in the range of 6,600–17,600 pounds thrust. It was planned that these would be available in 5 to 6 years. Eventually, the Klimov VK-1 would power the MiG-15 bis, and the MiG-17; the Mikhulin AM-5 would drive the MiG-19 and YAK-25; the Lyulka AL-7 eventually powered the Su-9 and Su-11 of the late fifties.

The 1946 plan coupled with the December 1945 commitment of resources by the Central Committee would allow the Soviets to achieve superiority in jet engine technology in the early 1950’s. It facilitated early emphasis on advanced technology by leap-frogging intermediate stages of development with adaptations of foreign designs. In effect, the Soviets would be mastering British jet technology almost concurrently with the United States.63 In the meantime, native airframe designs would continue on a par with those of other countries. One consequence of the resulting engine allocations, however, was that available power may have prejudiced the success of early prototypes in the program. It appears that early success may have prejudiced later success.