B-17s of the 381st Bomb Group, Ridgewell Airfield England, enroute to targets over Nazi-occupied territory.

Source: National Archives via the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB Alabama

The basic failure of the overall plan for the mission flown on 17 August 1943 has been thoroughly documented, particularly by Martin Middlebrook in his excellent book “Schweinfurt/ Regensburg Mission.” The original ten minute separation between the 4th Bomb Wing bound for Regensburg and thence to North Africa and the 1st Bomb Wing detailed for a return flight to and from Schweinfurt was thwarted by the delayed departure of the latter force by several hours. Fog conditions were retrospectively claimed as the primary reason for the delay, but the same conditions over 4th Bomb Wing bases did not prevent their departure barely one hour behind schedule. Not only would the Schweinfurt Force have to fight its way in both directions, but the revised I.P. forced upon the bombardiers would be located over what was featureless terrain, while the run-up to the target would be down-wind. In addition, tactical manoeuvers by the Force Leader, Col. Gross, would arguably add to the Wing’s difficulties.

 

These malign factors were way ahead of the Ridgewell crews, as they were alerted once more in the early hours, breakfasted, and assembled for briefing. Take-off time, originally scheduled for 0630, was repeatedly postponed until almost Noon, when 26 bombers with Maj. Hall in command lifted off and ultimately departed the English coast. The basic Group formation comprised 20 aircraft flying Low Group within the 101 PCBW. The remaining six aircraft from the 533BS took a Lead Sqdn slot within the PCBW’s Composite High Group Capt.

 

Baltrusaitus’ crew were among the most experienced at Ridgewell with 16 missions behind them, but the choice of target stunned those crewmembers present at the briefing into shocked silence. Sgt Tom Murphy (TG) was to record a graphic account of the mission, and especially the three hours spent over enemy territory without escort. Fighter attacks were in evidence even before the P-47s and Spitfires were forced to turn for home. The Luftwaffe assaults were to reach a peak of intensity extending from Eupen in Eastern Belgium as far as approach to Schweinfurt. However, two 534BS B-17s had already been taken down before Eupen; these were Lt. Weldon Simpson’s 42-30245 “Lucky Lady” and Lt. Forkner piloting 42-3227, whose aircraft crashed near Turnhout and Meerlaan. Simpson was his crew’s sole fatality, while Forkner not only got himself and all others out safely, but was listed as evading along with three other crewmen.

 

Sgt Murphy’s ship 42-29888 “The Joker” had been thrown upwards by a flak burst into the preceding element’s slipstream, and the pilots had a hard time fighting the resultant turbulence, which threatened to throw the Fortress out of control. Murphy then recalled yelling to the pilots to pull up in order to avoid an incoming rocket, which streaked through the formation to impact with a leading bomber. (Analysis of the mission does not support the use of such a form of weaponry, although these were used later in 1943.) In reality, it was to be the conventional attacks from ahead which proved the chief form of execution on this day. Very little firepower could be brought to bear by the American crews upon their tormentors as the Fw190s and Me 109s came in from this angle.

 

Five more Group bombers were lost prior to the formation’s skirting to the South of Frankfurt. First down was Lt N Wright’s 42-30028 “Sweet Le’ Lani,” with the 534BS crew succumbing to fighter attacks over Duren, but not before all ten men jumped. “Strato Sam” (42-3092) was a 533BS bomber flown by F/O Hudson, which fell to a combination of flak and fighters at Pesch. Almost immediately 42-30140, in the charge of Lt Painter (532BS), fell out and down to impact SE of Munsterfeld at Esch; Painter was the only fatality, and two of his crew not only evaded capture, but started out on an epic return to England. The bombardier, Lt Duke, was to later record that his reaction to the bale-out order was annoyance, since he was fully occupied with operating the nose gun and indeed was almost enjoying the experience! The fourth loss was 42-29983, which came to earth at Keeseling and bore Lt Challon Atkinson (P) and Sgt Jim McGoldrick to their deaths. The quintet of losses was completed when yet another 534BS crew, that o fLt Reinhard King in 42-29978 “Hells Angels,” was taken down by fighters. Sgt Cecil Floura (Eng.) recalled Lt King calling for the bombs to be salvoed before issuing the bale-out order, whereupon all ten cleared their doomed bomber, which crashed at Bad Schwalbach, NW of Wiesbaden.

 

Nineteen bombers were left when the LP. was reached, but official records state that only 18 made effective bombruns. However, although the B-17s of Lts. Harry Smith (535BS) and Leo Jarvis (532BS) crashed East and SE of Schweinfurt, respectively, de-briefing reports stated the former aircraft fell out of formation at a point where the Group was turning for the home leg. Smith’s own Post-war observations confirmed that he bombed and the B-17 was abandoned directly thereafter. One of this crew, Sgt Elsberry, stated that he came down near Bamberg and was free for the next 13 days. All ten crew survived, but Lt Gwinn (B) suffered a 20mm wound. Their B-17 42-3220 “Damfino” came down near Marksteinach, five miles East of Schweinfurt.

 

The crash location of Lt Jarvis’s B-17 42-29731 “Ole’ Swayback” was believed to be at Ebrach, 19 miles SE of Schweinfurt. As the Group turned off left from the target a flak strike knocked out all power on one side of this B-17, causing her to complete an involuntary roll. Apart from the loss of one eye suffered by Lt Bill Lockhart (who recollected that he suffered this injury after the bomb-run), he and the others all got out safely. Lt. Jarvis was fortunate to get out, however. Having called for the navigator to attach a chute pack to Lockhart, he then reached under his seat for his own pack – only to find to his horror that Lockhart’s pack had been grabbed from this position! Managing to stabilise the bomber, Jarvis hastily scrambled into the nose for the bombardier’s pack, clipped it on, and followed the others out.

 

Following the bomb-run and re-assembly there was a merciful lull in fighter attacks for upwards of an hour until the Rhine was being reached, after which the by now badly depleted force was assailed by fresh waves of Fw 190s and Me 109s. The 381 BG’s severely depleted ranks were to remain intact until the Belgian/German border was being traversed. It was then that Lt Loren Disbrow’s 42-3225 “Chugalug Lulu” was forced out of formation. The B-17 gradually descended as a result of steadily failing power, but there was still a chance of at least clearing the Belgian coast, if not getting across the English Channel. That hope was brutally shattered when Fw190s spotted the straggler near Liege and inflicted fatal damage. Lt Chapin (CP) was to recall that his emotions went from joyful anticipation to complete numbness in just a split second as the “abandon” signal was given. All ten crewmen jumped, leaving their B-17 to pile into the ground close to Tongeron. From this crew no less than four – T/Sgt Bruzewski (Eng.), T/ Sgt Tom Moore (ROG), S/Sgt Joseph J Walters (BT), and S/ Sgt Kiniklis (TG) – were to return to home via the Underground system. Although all four were at one time in the same place of concealment at Liege, the ultimate fate of a fifth evading crewmember, Sgt King (returned to England before or after Belgium’s Liberation or capture at some stage), is unclear from Group records. The other five men, among them a badly wounded Lt Jones (N), were less fortunate in ending up as POWs.

 

And so the Group left ten B-17s and their crews, totalling 101 men, behind as the sorely battered formation crossed the Belgian coast in the early evening sunshine. Although a total of five crewmen KIA was low, for 85 there was beginning the strange and shadowy existence of a “Kriegsgefangener,” or POW. The remaining eleven men were to experience the great good fortune of regaining friendly shores. In the case of Capt. Bob Nelson (532BS Operations ‘Officer) and S/Sgt Raymond Genz (TG), who had survived the demise of Lt Painter’s aircraft, their return was effected by the end of October – this after coming down well inside German territory!

 

Fifteen Group aircraft were now well out of danger from attack, but the sixteenth had been straggling home on its own for some time. Lt George Darrow’s 42-29735 had suffered engine problems on approach to the target and had drifted inexorably back and down through its own and succeeding formations. The B-17 eventually struggled to within a few miles of the Kent coast before gently settling into the mercifully calm Channel waters. All the crew survived the potentially lethal act of “ditching” to be soon fished out by RAF Air-Sea Rescue launches and delivered to the nearby RAF field at Manston one of three Emergency Landing Fields spread along the Eastern coast of England.

 

The bright promises for a successful mission in terms of bombing results coupled to low casualty rates had been shattered. The bunching up of the four Provisional Combat Bombardment Wings (PCBWs) on approach to the target had made for hurried and largely inaccurate bombing runs. This failure was probably caused by Col. Gross’ previous decision to lower the height of the two PCBWs under his charge. This was made in order to avoid flying through what was seen as a solid cloud barrier at the briefed altitude. He then regained the briefed altitude. This was a measure that the other half of the Task Force did not follow, as it flew all the way at the briefed altitude. The scale and intensity of the fighter opposition had taken a terrible toll of the 183 B-17s penetrating enemy air space, with no less than 36 of this figure MIA. (A similar proportion of loss was suffered by 4th Bomb Wing when 24 were MIA out of 124).

 

This attrition rate was insupportable if continuing to reoccur, and highlighted the pressing need for long-range escorts. Unfortunately, these were still months away, and in the interim period the 8th Bomber Command would be forced to proceed with its policy and leave the bombers fully naked to the aerial threat posed by the Luftwaffe. Schweinfurt was still treated as a top priority target, and a second strike could surely be counted upon before the onset of winter with its short days and uncertain weather might force a halt to this venture.

 

In one savage day’s combat the 381BG losses had been virtually doubled, and barely half the “original” crews were still on hand. The Group had earned the dubious distinction of suffering the highest loss-rate for any participating 1st Bomb Wing unit, although its 91BG partner had lost just one B-17 less. Morale must have been just a word, and the chances of coming through a tour of 25 missions seemingly worse than the chances of a victim of deep-seated cancer making a recovery. The sense of depression spread to the groundcrews. Mission pressures were none the less real for being in the hearts and minds of these “back-up” teams. Throughout World War II it was a regular feature for small groups to collect all around the airfield hours before the bombers were due to return, the casual air generally adopted concealing their apprehension at the thought of their specific B-17 failing to be part of the returning formation. All too often (131 times in fact) some of them would gaze Eastwards in growing and numbing disbelief as their dispersal remained starkly empty after all the bombers were down. Without their patient and physically demanding efforts the combat crews could not have guaranteed their own safety, particularly in the hostile environment over “Festung Europa.” The outwardly casual relationship between fliers and groundcrew often concealed what was a bond born out of mutual respect.

 

Col. azzaro was no exception to the depressive mood enveloping his base. Indeed, and in the immediate aftermath of the mission, the need to declare a “non-operational” status for the Group was discussed. This was successfully argued against on the grounds that continuing involvement in the next mission would prevent the Germans from realising how hard the 381BG had been hit. Although not a totally convincing line of thought, given that Luftwaffe Intelligence was efficient enough to promptly establish both the Group and Task Force loss-scale, the positive line of reasoning won the day. What amounted to a token force was assembled two days later.

 

Three airfields in Belgium and Holland were selected for attack on the 19th, with Gilze-Rijen and Flushing allotted to 1st Bomb Wing. The total force despatched was only 125, of which 93 made bomb-runs; Ridgewell’s contribution was seven and five, respectively. Lt Orlando Koenig had headed the 535BS “model” crew during the early days at Pyote. Today he and Lt Len Spivey (N) were part of a composite crew comprised of 535BS and 533BS crewmen. Their B-17 was 42-3101, which had been transferred-in from the 95BG in late July. Heading in to strike at Gilze-Rijen, the run was cancelled in its final stage, and the crews prepared to circle around for a second run. In this period fighters caught up with and knocked down Koenig’s aircraft. Lt Spivey was one of the fortunate survivors, along with Koenig, but a proportion of the crew was not so fortunate, the ball, waist, and tail-gunners all being killed.

 

For the rest of August the 8USAAF stuck to close-range targets, with 1st Bomb Wing striking Villacoubley (24th), Watten (27th), and Amiens/Glissey (31 st). It was a clear measure of the battering borne by the 381BG over Schweinfurt that just 17 aircraft in total were sent to the first two targets; only over Amiens/Glissey did the Group return to near-normal strength when 19 participated. And so the general tone of morale was steadily if cautiously resurrected from the nadir reached on the 17th. However, these missions were but an interim measure and were not likely to last, at which point the immeasurably harder option of facing unimpeded enemy opposition would recur.