The Director of Military Intelligence, Colonel Sir Francis Wingate, talking to an Arab civilian on leaving a train on the Sudan Military Railway, possibly near Atbara. Colonel Wingate spoke fluent Arabic. The Arab is probably Mohammed Fadl, a Sudanese spy from Dafur who was imprisoned and mutilated by the Khalifa. His right hand and left foot had been amputated as punishment.

If the southern section of the Cape to Cairo never got as far as Rhodes, or indeed Williams, had hoped, nor did the northern. Starting in Egypt and running through Sudan, it was an equally ambitious exercise simply because of the sheer scale of the enterprise, even though it passed through relatively easy territory. The line had to traverse vast swathes of desert, and its construction in those harsh conditions was only made possible through military discipline. Indeed, it was intended as a military railway built to give the British access deep into Sudan, and was constructed at the instigation of Herbert (later Lord) Kitchener, who at the time was the sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army.

Before the British occupied Egypt in 1882, the Egyptians already had an embryonic railway system, Africa’s first. Completed in 1856 the 120-mile line connected the port of Alexandria on the Mediterranean with Cairo and was designed by none other than the ubiquitous Robert Stephenson. The railway was no mean achievement, having to cross the Nile twice, and the line was highly profitable as it attracted travellers using the overland route between Europe and India, which avoids the long sea voyage via the Cape, who previously had to use camels or rough horse-drawn carriages to cross Egypt. Despite the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which took away much of its revenue, the railway was extended to reached Assiut on the banks of the Nile by 1874 and Luxor 340 miles south of Cairo in 1898.

Sudan, south of Egypt, had been abandoned in 1885 by the British after the siege of Khartoum which ended with the massacre of Gordon and his army by rebels, led by Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, a religious leader opposed to Western control of Egypt. A decade later, Kitchener obtained permission from the British government to build the Sudan Military Railway through to Khartoum in order to reconquer the country and defeat the Mahdi rebels. To get to Khartoum, hundreds of miles across the desert, Kitchener realized that a railway was needed from the Sudanese frontier at Wadi Halfa on the Nile which could be reached by ships from Luxor.

Helped by an eccentric but capable young Canadian military railway engineer, Edouard Girouard, and supplies from the United Kingdom, work started in 1896 with the reinstatement of an existing railway that had been destroyed by the Mahdi’s followers. At first progress was slow. While the territory was flat desert, conditions were difficult because of the water shortage, which was simultaneously also making life difficult for Pauling across the Kalahari 3,000 miles south. Temperatures were regularly above 40°C during the day but fortunately water, essential for both men and machines, was found at two points along the line, which saved the day. The labour force, too, was somewhat unreliable since a shortage of men had led to convicts and other misfits being taken on, but soon the military discipline and precision paid off and construction reached a ferocious pace with, at times, three miles being completed in a day. Girouard was greatly helped by the fact that he had cadged five engines, destined for the southern Africa section, from Rhodes, whom he had met on a trip back to London to sort out supplies. Every day, two trains were sent down the line from Wadi Halfa, where all the engineering work was carried out, to the teams laying the track. The first would arrive at dawn, carrying 2,000 yards of rail along with sleepers and the accessories needed to lay them, and, of course, water, while the second, at noon, brought in more rail and other equipment, but also the luxuries for the white engineers that kept their morale up: as well as food and water there would be whisky, cigarettes and even newspapers. Only halted by occasional battles, which were won easily thanks to the supply line, and intermittent problems with the availability of equipment, Kitchener and the railway reached Omdurman, on the outskirts of Khartoum, in September 1898 where the decisive battle for control of the country was fought, in which, incidentally, Winston Churchill took part.  A remarkable 576 miles of railway had been completed in under two years, amid conditions of extreme hostility both from the weather and the local population. No wonder that the railway was feted by Victorian writers as ‘the greatest weapon against the Mahdi’.

The Egyptian railways were standard gauge but Kitchener built his line to the cheaper Cape gauge, 3ft 6ins, demonstrating his ambition that one day it would meet up with Rhodes’s railways down south – although the more practical reason may have been that the five 3ft 6ins gauge locomotives Girouard had borrowed from Rhodes were Cape gauge. With rapid progress at both ends, by 1900 there seemed a strong possibility that the Cape to Cairo railway would be completed. That year, Rhodes had cheekily sent a telegram to Kitchener, saying ‘if you don’t look sharp, I will reach Uganda before you’. Kitchener replied, with equal chutzpah, ‘hurry up’. But there was a long way to go and the Boer War, the lack of will on the part of the British government, the blockage by the Germans in Tanganyika and the sheer ambition of the project meant it would never be completed.

As was the British way, with the exception of the Sudan line driven through by Kitchener and small sections in the Cape Colony and East Africa, the vast majority of the completed sections of the Cape to Cairo had been built by the private sector. The Cape to Cairo may never have been finished, but its partial construction left behind a notable legacy, helping to establish a permanent British presence in much of central and southern Africa and effectively creating the two new colonies of northern and southern Rhodesia which, understandably, were named after the railway’s principal protagonist.

Had the line been finished, it would not, in any case, have been a complete railway like the other transcontinentals. It was never envisaged that a traveller would have been able to undertake the whole journey in a single train because of the difference in gauges and the various sections covered by boat. The river journey on the Nile extended more than 850 miles and there were no plans to build a parallel railway.

Nevertheless, by 1928, with the construction of a section of line in Uganda, the whole journey became possible by public transport – buses, trains and steamers – and entirely on British territory as Mombasa, on the Kenyan coast, could be reached by a combination of boat and train from Khartoum. The building of the Sudan Military Railway had stimulated further development of the iron road in Sudan to serve local interests rather than as part of the grand design of a transcontinental railway. The railway reached Kosti, 240 miles south of Khartoum in 1911, from where a ship could be taken up the Nile to Juba. There followed a 100-mile journey in a bus over the frontier into Uganda where, at Nimule, a steamer and a further bus reached another railhead at Namagasali from where, after two separate lines had been linked in 1928, a direct train went to Mombasa. It was not a trip for the casual traveller!

The 1st Madras Pioneers, c. 1890

The Queen’s Own Madras Sappers and Miners, Review Order 1896.

The Madras Army, established by the East India Company, was one of the three presidency armies in India. The other two armies were the Bengal Army and the Bombay Army, and all three were abolished in 1895 and replaced by a single Indian Army.

There were European companies in the Madras Army from an early period, and it is known that there were three in 1742 and seven in 1748, when they were formed into a single regiment. In 1824, the Madras Army consisted of two European infantry battalions , fifty-two Madras Native Infantry battalions, three irregular infantry battalions, three light cavalry regiments, one European and one native artillery brigade, three battalions (of four companies each) of foot artillery, and two pioneer corps.

The Madras Army soldiers showed exceptional discipline and loyalty throughout the Indian Mutiny, and unlike the other two presidency armies, no Madras Army units mutinied. This fidelity can probably be attributed to the recruiting methods the Madras and Bombay Armies shared. While the soldiers of these two armies were generally of a lower caste (and physically shorter) , they were more concerned with gaining respect through their own merit and efforts, and much less interested in caste and class practices and traditions. This attitude also made Madras and Bombay Army soldiers more disciplined.

The post-mutiny army reorganization had little impact on the Madras Army, other than the renumbering of units.

The strength of the Madras Army in 1876 totaled 47,144 officers and men, broken down into 33,968 Indian Army officers and other ranks and 13,176 British Army officers and men. The Madras Army was the second largest of the three presidency armies.

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References: Beaumont (1977); Haythornthwaite (1995); Heathcote (1974); Hervey (1988); Mason (1974); Mason (1985);Wolseley (1878); Yong (2002)

Members of B Company 2 RAR about to go on a patrol in Perak in 1956. A Daimler Ferret armoured car has accompanied the patrol to its setting-off point in a rubber plantation. The patrol is responding to reports of communist guerrillas in the nearby jungle. Patrolling in search of guerrillas was the main task of the Australian Army during the Malayan Emergency. [AWM HOB/56/0751/MC]

In June 1948 a state of emergency was proclaimed in Malaya in response to Communist guerrilla activity. Problems had been developing for a considerable time. The British had imported Chinese and Indian labour to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations. They became a majority of the population – a fact deeply resented by Malays. The Chinese had suffered high unemployment in the 1930s, and had then been victimised by the Japanese after their conquest of Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party was in fact overwhelmingly (95 per cent) Chinese. They were determined to fight a restoration of British imperial power. The Communists’ main support was in the countryside. Barely scraping a living on the fringes of the jungle were perhaps 600,000 Chinese squatters. Their poverty and insecurity made them an ideal recruiting ground for guerrillas. Their strategy was simple – and potentially war-winning. They would paralyse the economy, by attacking rubber plantations and tin mines. The British would eventually cut their losses and leave.

But the fact that the guerrillas were Chinese shaped Britain’s response. Within China the Communists were in the ascendant, with the Guomindang regime collapsing. How great were their ambitions in Asia? Also, Communist inspired guerrillas were challenging colonial rule throughout the region. From London this all appeared part of a clearly orchestrated Communist strategy, intended to conquer all of Asia.

Guerrilla warfare in the jungle was a real challenge to British forces. They soon realised that air power had little value. Relying on bombs, napalm and defoliants was an exercise in futility. They could only harass the guerrillas. But ground operations would demand huge numbers of troops. Besides, every civilian killed by a stray shot would merely add to their enemies. Firepower, it was quickly recognised, was no solution. The guerrillas would have to be defeated politically.

The British developed a counter-insurgency strategy that eventually proved remarkably effective. Indeed Malaya was the only guerrilla war of its kind where the guerrillas were clearly defeated. Firstly a process of political reform, answering the demands of nationalists was introduced. This led, in 1957, to Malayan independence under a pro-western government. Also the British recognised that it was vital for them to be upholding the law. Emergency laws were drawn up which were drastic enough for the security forces to act effectively. But they were also clear enough so that the security forces were seen to act within the law themselves. Police work was seen as crucial. Good intelligence was more important than actually killing guerrillas. Generous surrender terms were offered. Cash rewards were available to those who surrendered weapons or offered information. Guerrillas could also surrender and request deportation to China without facing any questioning.

The most vital element in Britain’s counter-insurgency strategy, however, was their drive to win over the civil population. Winning ‘hearts and minds’, and depriving the guerrillas of popular support was a fundamental requirement of British strategy. The section of the population the British most urgently needed to win over were the 600,000 squatters who provided the guerrillas with most of their support. The strategy the British adopted to achieve this was both novel and ambitious. They decided to resettle the entire squatter population.

Separating the guerrillas from their supporters was an obvious step to make. It would deny the guerrillas supplies, recruits and intelligence. But the British did not consider any form of internment for the squatters. To win the squatters’ support they would have to provide very real material improvements in the squatters’ lives, far beyond anything the guerrillas could promise. The British provided rehousing, in new villages. Once there the squatters gained a degree of security of land tenure they had never before known. Citizenship rights were extended. In material terms they had luxuries such as electricity and safe water. Teachers and nurses were provided if they were available. Welfare officers, often Australian and New Zealander volunteers, protected their interests. The new villagers were given a degree of self-government, and, crucially, the protection of the security forces that allowed them to exercise it without fear of guerrilla reprisal. Eventually they could be given responsibility for their own protection.

By such tactics the areas in which the guerrillas could operate became ever more constricted. A band of guerrilla-free territory was driven across Malaya, leaving those in the south totally isolated. By the mid-1950s the guerrillas were clearly losing. They were never entirely destroyed. A safe haven in Thailand sustained guerrilla activity in the north. But they were no longer a serious threat. By July 1960 the emergency was declared over.

The British success was due to a number of factors. That the guerrillas were ethnically Chinese and had virtually no Malay support was one. More importantly was the very early recognition that firepower could not succeed alone. The British fought a political battle that was extremely expensive and required enormous patience to gain results. It also required the creation of a representative Malayan state that was responsive to popular needs. Success against Communist guerrillas was possible: but not a quick victory, and certainly not a purely military victory.

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Italians in Somalia

During the widespread European colonization in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Somalia became the target of both British and Italian ambitions. The British arrived much earlier, negotiating treaties for harbor facilities in 1840. By the middle 1880s, the British had negotiated agreements with a number of northern tribes and established a protectorate of sorts. The British wanted to control the local supply of foodstuffs to supply their major port of Aden, just to the north across the Gulf of Aden. They ultimately established the colony of Somaliland and finalized a border with Ethiopia in 1897.

Meanwhile, the Italians were slowly acquiring control over the southern part of the region, also by signing protection agreements. They took control of the lands of two rival sultans in 1889, at which time the Italians informed them that as of the Berlin Conference five years earlier, Italy was now the owner of what came to be called Italian Somaliland. The Italians continued to spread their influence southward at the expense of the sultan of Zanzibar, who finally ceded control of his claims in 1925.

In the interior of the country, however, King Menelik II managed both to keep his country free of European domination and also stake a claim for some Somali territory himself. He did so in a region known as the Ogaden. Unwilling to have the British dominate the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden region, the French also got into the act by claiming a slice of land on the coast between British and Ethiopian claims. This came to be the colony of French Somaliland, today known as Djibouti.

Through the later part of the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, the Italians and British established colonial administrations funded by taxation of the trade through the harbors they controlled. In the interior, however, Ethiopian military forces had no real source of income and had to live off the land in the Ogaden, thus alienating the Somalian population. It was this depredation at the hands of the Ethiopians that began a Somali nationalist movement. It started in 1899 under the leadership of a radical Muslim cleric, Mahammad Abdille Hasan. Hasan followed the Salihiyah order and his followers were the dervishes, the same order that had resisted Egyptian and British expansion into the Sudan two decades earlier. The dervish resistance movement came to target British as well as Ethiopian interests, and the British government, after some hesitation, committed troops to fight the “Mad Mullah.” In January 1904, Hasan suffered a major defeat which led to his signing a peace agreement in 1905 with both the British and Italian administrations. He honored it only for a couple of years before he was back in British Somaliland staging raids. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the fighting caused the death of some one-third of the northern Somali population and virtually destroyed the economy. Only Hasan’s death in 1920 (killed by British aerial attack on his capital at Taleex) ended the movement.

As in Libya, the Italians became intent on using Somaliland as an outlet for surplus population that would bring European standards to the region. The rise of Benito Mussolini’s fascism in the 1920s added further impetus to the plan, as the Italian government was eager to spread its influence wherever possible. Large-scale development projects, primarily agricultural, resulted in a major increase in the colony’s economy. In British Somaliland, however, there was less interest in local improvement; instead, the area remained a supply base for Aden as it had always been. The difference in economic growth showed itself when the two colonies merged later.

In 1935, Italy’s Mussolini began his aggressive campaign to reestablish the Roman Empire. His assault on Ethiopia was soon followed by a takeover of British Somaliland (1940). This brought, at least temporarily, a unification of the country. During the Italian occupation, the wealth was spread somewhat into the northern region and a barter economy was replaced with a monetary one. More immigrants, both Italian soldiers and civilians from the homeland, moved into Somaliland in order to consolidate Italian control. The Italian takeover also brought further trade with the outside world as well as an increase in public works. For the most part, the Italian occupation was beneficial to the country. Unfortunately, the occupation was brief, as the British established control in 1941 in all Italianheld areas of Africa. After placing Ethiopian King Haile Selassie back on the throne, the British returned the Ogaden region to his authority and placed the former Italian Somaliland under a military administration. The British goal was primarily peacekeeping. Local forces were raised in northern (Somaliland Scouts) and southern (Somalia Gendarmerie) regions, under British command.

The main long-term result of the occupation during World War II was the influx of weaponry into the country. Coupling that with the encouragement of rebels in the Ogaden to keep the British away from the border caused the population to become better armed and more aggressive. Most of the peacekeeping operations conducted during those years were attempts to disarm Somali bandit groups. Meanwhile, the new British administration began to implement some modernization. Spending more money in the northern region raised its standard of living. Health services and aid to agriculture were increased, as were attempts to expand the water supply for the herders in the countryside. Secular schools were initiated, as was a new judiciary which blended Islamic and British common law. Further, greater local political autonomy was granted as Italian appointees were removed and replaced by governing bodies which advised the British administration. On the other hand, Italian workers and specialists who had begun public improvements were kept on the job as long as they posed no security risk. Also, the Somalis were granted more access to police and civil service jobs.

The roots of Somali independence began with the formation of the Somali Youth Club, a political party formed in Mogadishu in 1943. By 1947, it was renamed the Somali Youth League and began to open party offices around the country. The League openly began to call for Somali unity and independence from both British and Ethiopian rule. Within a few years, a number of parties had formed, most based on a clan foundation, but some trying to unify the country without reference to any family or ethnic basis.

Technically, Italian Somaliland was still an Italian colony, but in 1945 the United Nations Council of Foreign Ministers was assigned the task of determining the nation’s future. Britain proposed a single united colony under their control. In January 1948, U.N. representatives arrived to gauge the depth of the Somali independence movement. The Somali Youth League and pro-Italian factions demonstrated to show off their strength, but clashes between the two factions led to violence. Still, the U.N. representatives decided, after talks with a number of parties, that independence was the correct path to follow. However, there was no agreement on how to lead the country to that path. The only solid decision made was to officially give the Ogaden region to Ethiopia, a move which angered Somali nationalists; it did, however, fulfill American and British needs for a military presence in Ethiopia. In 1949, the U.N. General Assembly finally took up the question of Somalia’s future. It was decided to allow Italy a 10-year trusteeship over their former colony with independence to be granted in 1960. This further angered the nationalist parties.

In the end, it made little difference. The British voluntarily ceded control of their administration in the north in 1960 so the area could unite with the southern provinces as soon as they became independent. The union took place on 1 July 1960 and the Somali Republic was proclaimed. A constitution was adopted based on the one in place in the southern provinces. Unfortunately, it ended up centering power in the south around the capital of Mogadishu, causing the northerners to feel they were getting less government attention. To keep the pot boiling, there were still active movements trying to reacquire the Ogaden from Ethiopia. Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (1967–1969) announced that Somalia would no longer claim the region, but that angered the Somalis so much that the army, under the leadership of General Mohamed Said Barre, overthrew Egal. That not only ended his career, but also ended party politics in Somalia.

South Malakand Camp, August 1897

Pashtun tribesmen attacking a British–held fort in 1897

The ambush and murder in the Tochi Valley of the political agent, Mr. H. A. Gee, and the commander and other soldiers of his military escort in early July 1897 sparked the general uprising of the Pathan tribes on the North – West Frontier of India. A punitive expedition, the Tochi Field Force, was organized and sent to castigate the perpetrators from the Madda Khel of the Isazais tribe.

The wave of religious fervor, coupled with tribal concerns about growing British power and the possible loss of independence, spread quickly to the Swat Valley. A warning to prepare for tribal unrest was sent to the Malakand Brigade, commanded by Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn with elements in two garrisons astride the line of communication with Chitral. In the fort at Malakand were one squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers; No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery; No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners; and three infantry battalions: the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry and the 45th Sikhs. Ten miles northeast of the Malakand Fort was the Chakdara Fort, established to protect the suspension bridge over the Swat River, and garrisoned by 180 soldiers from the 45th Sikhs and 20 from the 11th Bengal Lancers.

Late on 26 July 1897 word of the approach of tribesmen— Swatis, Utman Khels, Mamunds, Salarais, and others, later joined by Bunerwals — was received at the Malakand Fort. A detachment of the 45th Sikhs was sent to delay their advance and, reinforced by the remainder of its battalion, successfully maintained its position until the tribesmen withdrew at about 2:00 A.M. During that time, however, a determined attack had been made on the north and center sectors of the Malakand Fort, with tribesmen successfully occupying an outbuilding and stealing ammunition until withdrawing at about 4:00 A.M.

Ferocious attacks against the Malakand Fort and desperate counter attacks by the British were conducted throughout the following four days and nights. A relief column under Colonel A. J. Reid arrived at the Malakand Fort on 31 July 1897, reinforcing the exhausted British defenders. Between the start of hostilities on 26 July 1897 and 1 August 1897, the Malakand garrison sustained 20 officers killed and wounded and 158 other ranks killed and wounded. Brigadier General (later General) Sir Bindon Blood, who was appointed to command an expeditionary force to punish the revolting tribes, arrived at Malakand on 1 August 1897 and assumed control of the operations. On 2 August 1897, a relief column from Malakand left for Chakdara. Meeting determined opposition along the way, this column was able to relieve Chakdara later that evening.

While the Malakand Fort had been under almost continuous attack from the tribesmen, the Chakdara Fort had also been holding out against tremendous odds. From 26 July until 2 August 1897, the disciplined, skilled Chakdara garrison, with 5 killed and 10 wounded, had killed an estimated 2,000 tribesmen. The tribesmen later admitted to having lost 3,700 killed, plus many more wounded.

The Malakand Field Force, under Blood’s overall command, was quickly constituted and ready for operations on 7 August 1897. It consisted of three brigades plus divisional troops. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General W. H.Meiklejohn, consisted of the 1st Royal West Kents, 24th and 31st Punjabis, and 24th Sikhs. The 1st East Kents, 35 th Sikhs, 38th Dogras, and Guides Infantry composed Brigadier General P. D. Jeffreys’s 2nd Brigade. Commanded by Brigadier General J. H. Wodehouse, the 3rd Brigade consisted of the 1st West Surreys, 2nd Highland Light Infantry, 2 2nd Punjabis, and 39th Garhwal Rifles .This force advanced up the Swat Valley, dispersing opposition, and received the submission of the Swat Valley tribes on 24 August 1897.

Before Blood had a chance to pacify other tribes and restore order in the area, he was ordered to advance into Bajaur and coordinate operations with the Mohmand Field Force, commanded by Brigadier General E. R. Elles. ( On 6 August 1897, eleven days after the assault on the Malakand Fort , the Mohmands had attacked the border police fort of Shabkadr, 15 miles north of Peshawar.) Blood’s brigades frequently operated independently in the systematic operations to punish the clans in the Mamund Valley. Numerous villages were destroyed and supplies were confiscated and used to feed the British transport animals while occasional attacks were made on the British camps.

On 21 September 1897, Blood’s 3rd Brigade was attached to the Mohmand Field Force, and he reorganized his force before continuing operations. Twelve or fourteen villages were burned by the 2nd Brigade on 29 September. The Malakand Field Force attacked the villages of Agrah and Gat on 31 September, but it encountered surprisingly stubborn resistance as “it soon became apparent that large numbers of the enemy were concealed amongst the crags on the spur between the two villages” (Nevill 1912, p. 242). Fighting became desperate, and a British counter attack with bayonets fixed captured Gat. British casualties that day were 12 officers and men killed and 49 wounded.

The village of Badalai was destroyed on 3 October 1897, and active operations against the Mamunds ended although a settlement was not made until 18 October. The Malakand Field Force had accomplished its mission and was then dissolved.

Winston L. S. Churchill, who served as a war correspondent with the Malakand Field Force, immortalized the operations of this punitive expedition and the generalship of its commander through the publication of his book The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War. In many respects, the Malakand operations (as noted on the dustjacket of the 1990 reprint of The Story of the Malakand Field Force) were similar to those of m any other savage British campaigns on the North- West Frontier: “The danger and difficulty of attacking these fierce hill men is extreme. It is a war without quarter: They kill and mutilate everyone they catch and we do not hesitate to finish their wounded off.”

References: Barthorp (1982); Churchill (1898); Featherstone (1973); Fincastle and Eliott-Lockhart (1898); MacNeil (1997); Nevill (1912)

‘WHITE TRIBE OF AFRICA’

Descendants of Dutch settlers, the Boers were devoutly religious, and learned to ride and shoot from an early age. They lacked discipline, but were formidable adversaries.

The Boers recognized the danger from Britain and spent money throughout the 1890s purchasing modern weaponry, including artillery, from various European powers. Their artillery would prove to be very good during the coming conflict, but it was the Mauser rifles they purchased from Germany that made the Boers such formidable soldiers. Already expert riflemen, the Boers found in the Mauser M1889 a superb weapon, ideal for their style of fighting. With a five-shot magazine and reliable bolt action, the Mauser fired a heavy 8mm (0.3in) round with deadly accuracy. On the open veldt of southern Africa, the Boers were able to deliver lethally accurate rifle fire at incredible distances.

Virtually every Boer rode to battle on horseback, but they did not fight as cavalry. Instead, they fought as mounted infantry. Riding into position, they dismounted to engage the enemy. With their horses tethered nearby, they could easily remount and manoeuvre quickly to take advantage of an enemy mistake, seal off an enemy breakthrough or make a rapid withdrawal if necessary. They were trained to fight in dispersed open order and make good use of natural cover, firing from concealed positions. They relied heavily upon the firepower of their rifles to stop an enemy attack or support their own advance, rarely seeking to engage in close combat. Such tactics, combined with superb marksmanship and a naturally aggressive fighting nature, made the Boers some of the finest infantry in the world. By anyone’s estimation, the ‘White Tribe of Africa’, as the Boers were sometimes known, made a formidable opponent.

The Boers did have their weaknesses, however. Unlike other indigenous armies that had fought the British, the Boers were heavily outnumbered by their British opponents. They were a fiercely democratic society, and did not readily lend themselves to military discipline. Boer commandos (militia units) were difficult to control, and at times would leave a battlefield on their own initiative, heedless of their commanding general’s orders. They were also about to engage in a full-scale war against one of the Great Powers of Europe. Britain had global reach, undisputed control of the sea lanes and the ability to take the battle right into the heart of the Boer republics. With the resources of a massive empire behind them, the British held significant advantages at the strategic level of warfare. However, at the operational level, Boer generals would prove themselves to be wily adversaries, and at the tactical level, the Boer mounted infantry would reveal themselves to be tough and tenacious opponents.

GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.

Botha was a charismatic leader and the principal Boer commander in the Second Boer War. He eventually made peace with the British and later became the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa.

BRINGING IN BRITISH PRISONERS.

The superior infantry tactics of the Boers helped them inflict a series of shocking defeats on the British Army in the opening stages of the Second Boer War

As the great century of imperial expansion began to wane, weapons technology was beginning to disseminate. Native Americans, Afghans, Abyssinians and Sudanese were among many indigenous forces now equipped with firearms and cannon, though their quality remained inferior and their troops’ training poor. By 1899, the British Army had become masters of fighting colonial wars. The major problems in such conflicts usually revolved around logistics and the ability to project British military power into the farthest reaches of the globe. The battlefield was rarely the problem – setting aside notable setbacks like Isandhlwana. The superior leadership, training, discipline and weaponry of the British infantry allowed them to overcome vast numbers of indigenous forces lacking in those essentials.

However, the string of victories racked up by the British Army in the latter half of the nineteenth century inspired a false confidence in its military tactics. Weaponry was evolving dramatically in this era, and the introduction of the magazine-fed bolt-action rifle dramatically increased the amount of firepower available to the infantryman of the age. While such advanced weaponry remained beyond the reach of most indigenous forces, one group was to acquire these weapons and use them to deadly effect against the British in the largest and bloodiest colonial conflict waged in the era – the Second Boer War of 1899-1902.

The Boers (the Dutch word for ‘farmers’) were the original white settlers in South Africa, having arrived in the 1600s during the first great age of European exploration and colonization. The British took the region from Holland during the Napoleonic Wars, and brought British rule, but few British settlers, to the region. The Dutch inhabitants accepted this state of affairs until the 1830s, when Britain outlawed slavery throughout the empire. The Dutch refused to comply and thus began the Great Trek as they migrated into the heart of southern Africa. They encountered powerful warrior tribes and had to fight every step of the way. Out of necessity, Boer men were trained from childhood to ride and shoot, and they made formidable opponents for the African tribes they encountered.

British attempts to bring the Boers back under British rule failed. When force was used in the First Boer War, the British suffered a stunning defeat at Majuba Hill in 1881, where Boers armed with rifles but no heavy weapons routed a powerful British force from its hilltop position. The resulting peace treaty recognized Boer independence and the Boers eventually formed two separate nations, the Republic of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. They might have been left alone, were it not for the discovery of vast amounts of gold in their new nations. This, along with the diamonds they also found, made the Boers very wealthy indeed. Leading British imperialists such as Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902) cast covetous eyes upon the wealth of the Boers and began to set in motion events to provoke a war, its aim being to bring the Boer wealth into their own hands.

Contemporary illustration of Major Marchand’s trek across Africa.

A “friendly understanding,” the Entente Cordiale was an agreement signed on April 8, 1904, between France and Britain resolving longstanding colonial grievances. The agreement initiated a policy of Anglo-French cooperation and served as the embryo for the Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia during World War I.

Before the entente, Britain focused on maintaining a policy of “splendid isolation” from continental European affairs, and France became increasingly preoccupied with the preservation of its security after its 1871 defeat by Prussia, which subsequently unified a German state. A temporary shift in German policy, emphasizing relations with Britain, prompted Russia to fear isolation. France, seeking an ally against Germany, sought an 1891 Russian entente and eventually signed a military pact in 1894 that became a cornerstone of foreign policy for both countries.

Recent developments in Egypt had strained France’s relations with Britain. The khedive declared bankruptcy in 1876, and a system of Anglo-French control, using an international financial commission, worked to eliminate Egypt’s debt. But in 1882, an uprising prompted Britain to secure the Suez Canal. When France refused to assist, Britain occupied Egypt unilaterally and dissolved dual control. A humiliated France used its creditor position to complicate British attempts to reform international financial control. French foreign minister Théophile Declassé believed that Britain would negotiate over Egypt if pressured at a vital location. He chose Fashoda on the upper Nile River, but the venture led to another humiliation in the Fashoda Incident of 1898. After Fashoda, France altered its Egyptian policy from confrontation to compensation and focused on Morocco to complete its North African empire and to improve its Mediterranean position.

Fear of German naval expansion and tension with Russia, meanwhile, made France attractive to Britain. In 1903, King Edward VII of Britain and French President Émile Loubet made reciprocal state visits to mend Anglo-French relations. Negotiations between Paul Cambon, French ambassador, and Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary, then ran from July 1903 to April 1904. The talks involved Madagascar, the New Hebrides, Newfoundland fishing rights, Siam, and West Africa. At the center of negotiations, however, was the future of Egypt and Morocco. Britain jettisoned its Moroccan ambitions in return for promises of free trade lasting 30 years. France agreed to give Britain a free hand in Egypt and to refrain from Mediterranean coastal fortifications that could menace Gibraltar. To prevent a German alliance, Britain also argued Spain’s Moroccan interests needed consideration. Subsequent German behavior in the Moroccan Crisis of 1905 served to deepen Anglo- French collaboration and led to the military conversations of 1906–1914.

An Anglo-Russian entente followed in 1907, establishing a spheres-of-influence understanding in Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet, but also paving the path toward formation of the Triple Entente and ultimately an alliance that confronted Germany with a two-front war in August 1914.

FURTHER READING: Andrew, Christopher. Théophile Declassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968; Dunlop, Ian. Edward VII and the Entente Cordiale. London: Constable, 2004; Rolo, P.J.V. Entente Cordiale: The Origins of the Anglo-French Agreements of April 8, 1904. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969.

A diplomat who attempted to foment a Muslim uprising against the British in the Middle East, Wilhelm Wassmuss was born in Salzgitter-Ohlendorf (Lower Saxony) on 14 February 1880. He joined the German Foreign Office as a translator in 1906 and became the consul in Bushire, Persia (Iran), six years later. Because of his fluency in Persian (Farsi) and Arabic, his travels among the tribes of southern Persia, and his hardened personality, Wassmuss was selected for a joint Turkish and German mission designed to bring Persia and Afghanistan into World War I. His role was to lead the German group—numbering several dozen men—and handle the diplomatic negotiations with the Afghans. Second in command was Oskar von Niedermayer, who had also traveled extensively in the region. To disguise their expedition as it passed through neutral Romania, they posed as a traveling circus troupe, although their equipment was detected by a customs inspector and had to be replaced.

In January 1916, after dissension arose between the Turks and the Germans as well as in the ranks of Wassmuss’s team, he handed the command to Niedermayer and departed on his own, clad in Persian garb and posing as a Muslim. His objective was to reconnect with tribal leaders he knew in southern Persia and convince them to embark on a holy war, forcing the British to commit their limited troops to that region. On 5 March, he and two companions were captured by a group of horsemen in the pay of the British. Wassmuss escaped but had to leave behind a crucial German diplomatic codebook, which the British later used to help decipher the Zimmermann Telegram. His plan to extend the anti-British campaign to India also had to be abandoned because of the loss of specially prepared incendiary leaflets.

After establishing a base of operations in Shiraz, he resumed contact with his principal allies, the bellicose Tangistani tribesmen, but proved unable to lure the leaders of the Bakhtiári into hostilities against the British. A bounty for Wassmuss’s capture was proposed by Percy Cox, the chief British political officer in Basra, but was overruled by the Foreign Office in London. When the Tangistani attacked the British residency in Bushire in July, they were repulsed. Wassmuss’s focus then shifted to Isfahan, the new base of operations, and Kermanshah, which controlled the supply route from Baghdad into the country. He next targeted the small, isolated British consulate in Shiraz relying on the local gendarmerie, which was sympathetic to his efforts. The British commander, Frederick O’Connor, and his staff were easily captured and were to be traded for Germans being held in India. Yet in the process of negotiating with the British, Wassmuss unknowingly let O’Connor, a former Indian Army intelligence officer, communicate with his superiors in Bushire employing a secret code. These officials approached the Tangistani and offered to trade fellow tribesmen held prisoners for the British hostages. When the exchange finally took place on 10 August 1916, Wassmuss vented his deep frustration that his plan regarding the German hostages had been thwarted. He remained at large in Persia for the remainder of the war, proving to be primarily a nuisance rather than a threat to British interests. O’Connor described him as a solitary figure living “in extreme simplicity in the native manner” and riding “continuously about the country, from place to place, from tribe to tribe, in every extreme of climate, and always at the mercy of these treacherous, fanatical people.”

Apprehended by Persian authorities in 1918 and transferred to the British in Tehran, Wassmuss escaped but was quickly recaptured. Despite demands for a trial for war crimes, he was permitted to return to Germany. Aware of his unfulfilled promises to the Tangistani, Wassmuss tried to bring modern farming techniques to the tribesmen and raise their standard of living. His attempt ended badly, and he again returned to Germany, dying impoverished in Berlin on 29 November 1931.

Africa was affected by the war in many spheres: military, political, economic, and social. The results were not the same everywhere. In areas where there had been actual fighting, notably in the German colonies, the people suffered greatly. In the French colonies, where the burden of conscription had been heavy, there were anti-colonial protests and widespread resentment. Indeed, in many areas the colonial authorities’ hold on power was weakened: their military were redirected to the war effort; markets and trade routes were disrupted; and the economic recession and growing unemployment that followed the war generated their own tensions.

Military recruitment had temporarily strengthened existing colonial armies, but many of the newly recruited troops perished. The actual number of casualties will never be known exactly, but it was undoubtedly large: of those recruited by the French almost 200,000 lost their lives, while nearly 100,000 lost their lives in the British campaign in East Africa. For the soldiers who survived the war, the experience broadened their view of both African affairs and world politics. They understood the causes of the war and the nature of imperialism, and could begin to consider the impact of colonialism on their own countries. Many acquired practical skills and a degree of technical education that they were able to put to good use after the war. For many the experience of Europeans in combat that they acquired during the war comprehensively undermined notions of white superiority.

African economies were affected in several ways. There was increased production of agricultural and mineral commodities for the war effort, but taxes were also increased and development expenditure cut. For example, Nigeria’s expenditure increased by about £1,400,000; in 1915, despite reduced revenues, FF5,860,000 were sent to France from French West Africa. In addition, various colonies raised relief funds and local war subscriptions. The economic losses took other forms too, associated with political disturbances, wildcat revolts, the scarcity of essential commodities, abandonment of development projects, the conscription of able-bodied men, and general discontent and growing unemployment in a number of cities. The dislocation of populations, shortage of shipping, and high costs for freight led to panic and an aggressive search for alternative markets. In the early months of the war, the withdrawal of German traders from regions where they had been the primary buyers of export crops, led to a loss of income for many local traders and producers. Where army recruitment had been intense many villages and rural areas were devastated by the loss of productive labor, with the number of male farmers declining considerably. The war and immediate post-war years also witnessed widespread food shortages and epidemics, including the devastating influenza pandemic of 1918–19.

A major shift occurred in the organization of foreign trade, which created new tensions between Europe and Africa. During the war, many African export traders were displaced by foreign firms that manipulated war conditions to their advantage. French and British companies dominated the important export business, backed by their colonial governments. In addition, these firms took control of businesses deserted by the Germans, thereby controlling the import trade as well. Furthermore, foreign firms established combines that forced down producer prices, emerging after the war as large firms with enormous power over the market and prices in general – all at the expense of African producers.

Germany lost its African colonies, which were shared out as ‘‘mandated territories’’ by the newly created League of Nations. The Belgians took over Ruanda-Urundi, South Africa received Namibia, the British obtained Tanganyika and northern Cameroon (added to their Nigerian colony), the French took the rest of Cameroon, and the British and French divided Togo. The expectation was that the European powers would serve only as guardians; in practice, this meant little or nothing to the African population, who were still treated as colonial subjects. When the League of Nations was dissolved in 1940, the status of these mandated territories was left unclear. The expectation that these ‘‘guardians’’ would prepare the countries for self-government was largely ignored.

There were other notable changes to the pattern of colonial rule. In January 1914, for example, the British Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria were amalgamated. In 1917 a large part of western Egypt was transferred to Italian Libya, and was then administered as three units (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzān). The triangle of land to the northwest of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was transferred to Italy, also in 1917. In 1920 the French created the colony of Upper Volta from parts of the Niger, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. Upper Volta was subsequently divided in 1932. Thus the modern map of Africa began to acquire its current shape.

Many of the economic and social changes affected politics, contributing to the emergence of African nationalism. Colonial conquests and the war had taken from Africans many of their businesses and administrative jobs. They began to realize that they would have to insist on – perhaps even fight for – reforms if they were ever to regain what they had lost. War propaganda had condemned Germany for wanting to dominate the world, and by 1919 the principle of self-determination had become widely known. Soon the right of all people to determine their own affairs had developed from being an anti-German slogan to one that the African elite could capitalize on – what was right for Europe was equally right for Africa. Even though independence was still distant, a spirit of national consciousness had begun to develop among Africans.

The colonial authorities by and large ignored this pressure from the African elites, and the expectation that the end of the war would bring power and prestige to Africans was not realized. Early leaders of the nationalist movements in Africa were anxious to see constitutional reforms that would give educated Africans a greater role in determining their own affairs, and political parties began to emerge: the National Congress of British West Africa, for example, was founded in 1920 to demand far-reaching political reform. Small concessions were granted in the 1920s, allowing a few people from the educated elite to sit on legislative councils in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. More significantly, in North Africa revolts in Egypt had led to its independence by 1922.

Another political outcome of the war was that it enabled the colonial governments to consolidate themselves. Even as African participants in the First World War began to expect remarkable changes in their lives, colonial governments were planning ways to make their control of Africa and its resources more permanent. The contribution of Africans to the war effort were simply ignored. Having won the war, the European powers in Africa felt even more confident of their ability to rule there: some officers expressed the opinion that they would remain in charge of the continent for ever. In some areas, such as the Belgian colonies and South Africa, colonial repression became more entrenched. Whether repressive or not, the victorious colonial powers shared one goal: the economic exploitation of Africa. In view of the devastation caused to their economies by the war, they saw the control of Africa as the best way of recouping their losses and rebuilding their economies.

Further reading Boahen, A.A. (1985) UNESCO General History of Africa. Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880–1935, London: Heinemann. Digre, B.K. (1987) The Repartition of Tropical Africa: British, French and Belgian Colonial Objectives During the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference, Ph.D. thesis, George Washington University. Lunn, J. (1999) Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War, Oxford: James Currey. Page, M.E. (1987) Africa and the First World War, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Reigel, C.W. (1989) The First World War in East Africa: A Reinterpretation, Ed.D. thesis, Temple University.