The siege of Ulsan castle during the winter of 1597/8. one of the most bitter campaigns of the Korean War.

 

The Japanese army marches to the relief of Ulsan, from a painted screen in the collection of the Nabeshima family. The steady progress of the relieving army across the frozen river is clearly shown.

 

In the meantime, the Japanese troops in Korea had settled down to garrison life in their string of forts that stretched from Ungch’on in the west to Sosaeng in the northeast. Some 78,600 of the invasion force were left after the withdrawal from Seoul. They fought no significant military actions after the sixth month of 1593, when they took the great Korean fortress of Chinju by storm, thereby demonstrating once more that they could not so easily be forced off the peninsula. Instead, the common draftees cultivated the fields and rice paddies around their positions. The generals, too, engaged in activities little different from those they might have pursued in peacetime in their own country. They hobnobbed with one another and with the merchant burghers (rnachishu) of Sakai and other war profiteers attracted to their camps. They held tea ceremonies in tea houses of the sukiya type built by carpenters summoned from Japan, exercised their literary skills at sessions of linked verse (renga and wakan) convoked in the properly Japanese ambience of chambers specially constructed in the shoin style of architecture, played the peculiarly Japanese game of kickball (kemari) on authentically laid out courts, and caroused in the Japanese manner at sake parties given diversity by amateur displays of dancing (rambu). In short, they made themselves right at home in Korea. If they were bored by lack of action, hunts relieved their ennui even as they served to supply one of their master’s fancied needs: The tiger population of Korea had to suffer because Hideyoshi believed tiger meat to be a balm that would restore his tottering health.

 

The pent-up energy of these garrison troops, augmented by new levies sent from Japan to form an army of 141,500, was released on Korea in Hideyoshi’s second campaign of aggression, which began on Keicho 2.7.15 (August 27, 1597) with an event rare in this war, a Japanese naval victory. As a result of this battle, which was fought off Koje Island, the inept Korean commander, Won Kyun (an intriguer who had succeeded in displacing Yi Sun-sin from his post half a year previously), lost his life; the Korean navy lost its base on Hansan Island and its domination of the southern coast, being obliged to withdraw far to the west; and the conditions were created for the Japanese to advance in force into Cholla Province, something they had not been able to do in the first campaign. Indeed, the occupation of Cholla and Ch’ungch’ong provinces, through the rapid deployment of a massive force from its bases in Kyongsang Province, was the operational plan of Hideyoshi’s armies in their return venture to Korea. If they reached their objectives, the Japanese would dominate the southern half of the peninsula; if they held their gains, they would in effect obtain the partition of Korea, which was Hideyoshi’s – vastly reduced – war aim of 1597. To be sure, boasts about a future conquest of China do not fail to appear in the marching orders he issued to the daimyo in advance of the second campaign, but they sound halfhearted.

 

Anticipating the Japanese resumption of the war, the Chinese court in the second month of 1597 decided to send a new expeditionary force to the support of its vassal state, Korea. By the middle of the sixth month, the advance guard of this army reached Namwon, a town in Cholla close to the Kyongsang border, fortified the place, and prepared to stand a siege there. Two months later, however, Namwon fell to a strong Japanese force under Ukita Hideie (daimyo of Okayama, 1573-1655), putting all of Cholla Province at the mercy of the invaders. At the same time another large Japanese army, under the overall command of Mori Hidemoto (the future daimyo of Yamaguchi, 1579- 1650), poured forth in three streams from Kyongsang and burst into Ch’ungch’ong Province to challenge the main body of the Ming expeditionary force, which was based in Seoul. A division of this army, led by Kato Kiyomasa, even penetrated Kyonggi Province, reaching Chiksan, less than seventy kilometers away from Seoul. This time, however, the Japanese got no farther. They were blocked on the border of Ch’ungch’ong and Kyonggi by the Chinese army. Their fleet, too, was blocked from coming to the support of the land forces. It had rounded the southwestern corner of the peninsula and was heading for the Yellow Sea through the Myongnyang Strait when it was intercepted and defeated by the Korean navy under its reinstated commander Yi Sun-sin.

 

The naval battle of Myongnyang, which took place on Keicho 2.9.14-16 (October 24-26, 1597), marked the turn of the tide in Hideyoshi’s second Korean campaign. The Japanese lost the initiative, were again forced on the defensive, and withdrew to fortified places along the coast closest to Japan. This time, their fortress belt stretched farther than it had after the first campaign, forming an arc that extended more than two hundred kilometers from Sunch’on in the west through Sach’on and Pusan to Ulsan in the east. Soon enough, the Japanese generals in Korea were given ample reason to conclude that their forces were in fact overextended. Kato Kiyomasa’s fortress at Ulsan, still under construction, was invested in January 1598 by a great Chinese-Korean army and could be relieved only with great difficulty. The siege of Ulsan was a near thing, and the experience impelled the Japanese commanders to request permission to reduce their perimeter by abandoning some of the more exposed forts. This request fell on deaf ears, as Hideyoshi was determined to leave all of his bases in Korea, come what may.

Borodino, the only major set-piece battle during Napoleon’s campaign in Russia, was fought between the Grande Armée and the Russian armies of General Mikhail Kutuzov, around the village of Borodino, a small hamlet on the banks of the Kaluga River near the confluence with the Moskva, about 115 kilometers west of Moscow. The battle is best known for the tenacity with which the two evenly matched opponents fought and for the horrendous carnage that resulted in this extremely bloody—and yet inconclusive— battle, whose losses exceeded those of every other engagement of the period apart from Leipzig in 1813.

Having defeated the retreating Russians at Smolensk and capturing that city in August, Napoleon closely pursued the 1st and 2nd Armies of the West, under Kutuzov, who succeeded General Barclay de Tolly as commander in chief on 20 August. While Barclay urged immediate confrontation with the French, then steadily advancing east, Kutuzov decided instead to withdraw to Borodino, there to make a stand, a decision made as a result of political pressure urging the defense of Moscow. The main part of the Grande Armée duly followed, with an Austrian auxiliary corps under Karl Philipp Fürst zu Schwarzenberg and French general Jean Reynier observing Alexander Tormasov’s 3rd Army of Observation and Pavel Chichagov’s Army of the Danube far to the south, while Marshal Macdonald’s corps kept watch on the Russians situated far to the north.

Although the French had left the vicinity of Smolensk with 156,000 men as recently as 19 August, by the time they reached the outskirts of Borodino on 5 September they were down to 133,000 fit for action (86,000 infantry, 28,000 cavalry, and 16,000 artillerists) and 587 guns, all units depleted by disease and generally wearied by the laborious march deep into Russia that had begun on 22 June. The Russians mustered about 155,000 men, of whom 115,000 were regulars (the remainder were Cossacks and militia) plus they were more rested and enjoyed a numerical superiority in artillery, with 640 guns. Nevertheless, the Russian total included a proportion of virtually untrained militia known as Opelchenie, about the same number of new recruits in the regular army, and a large body of Cossacks who could not be relied upon to execute orthodox charges against formed troops. Thus, the two armies stood on approximately equal terms.

The French advance guard made contact with the Russians on 5 September when they came in sight of the Shevardino redoubt, a forward earthwork manned by General Dmitry Neverovsky’s division, supported by light infantry and cavalry, which the Russians had constructed about 3 miles southwest of Borodino. The French could tolerate no such hindrance to their general advance, so early on the evening of the fifth a division, supported by cavalry, seized the redoubt at bayonet point after an hour’s exchange of musketry and artillery fire. Entering the entrenchment, the assailants found it choked with bodies. Driven out again by Russian grenadiers, the French finally took possession when, around midnight, the defenders retired after the place was pronounced untenable.

On the following day, the sixth, the main body of the Grande Armée appeared along the New Post Road and began a reconnaissance of Kutuzov’s position. There was to be no fighting on this day; instead, both sides spent the day reorganizing, deploying their infantry and cavalry, siting their artillery, and planning the forthcoming battle. Having established a respectable line of earthwork field fortifications, Kutuzov arranged a religious procession to inspire his very devout troops to fight for “Holy Russia.” He then rested his men, satisfied to await the French onslaught.

Russian dispositions were based on a largely static defense, with their right under the command of Barclay de Tolly and their left under General Peter Bagration. Kutuzov established his line on a ridge that looked down on the Semenovskaya creek, with his forces straddling Borodino in his center. His right wing faced north, running parallel to the south bank of the shallow Kalatsha River as far as its confluence with the Moskva; his left, facing west, extended southward from the formidable Rayevsky (or “Great”) Redoubt (mounting eighteen pieces of artillery and protected to the front by “wolf pits” dug the previous day) through the ruined village of Semenovskaya, then past three arrowshaped earthworks known as flêches to the village of Utitsa, which sat atop a knoll on the Old Post Road, beside which stood thick woodland. Much of Kutuzov’s position was covered by heavy brush and trees, not least the Utitsa woods. Large bodies of Cossacks, unreliable against formed bodies of troops but effective in harassment, scouting, and postbattle pursuit, protected both flanks. Finally, light infantry extended along the entire front. Several brooks intersected the area; these, and the knolls, woods, and ridges at various points along a position measuring only 8 kilometers long, left exceptionally little room for maneuver; conversely, there would be plenty of opportunity for massed artillery to wreak havoc in the tightly packed formations on both sides.

Apart from the strongpoint captured by the French at Shevardino, the field fortifications along the main Russian line, though rapidly constructed, were by no means unimpressive. Earthwork structures manned with artillery stood around Borodino, near Utitsa, and on the right flank to cover the fords of the Kalatsha River. The two most formidable, however, were the Rayevsky Redoubt and the flêches built by Bagration. The Russian reserves were kept close to the front line, a great mistake as they were to make an ideal target for massed French artillery.

With his left anchored on woods and his center strongly fortified, the Russians probably expected Napoleon to turn their right, and hence the relatively stronger dispositions around Gorki, the site of Kutuzov’s headquarters. Napoleon, however, decided against making his main thrust against the Russian right on account of the high banks of the Kalatsha. He also rejected Marshal Davout’s proposal for a wide, sweeping maneuver to the south with 40,000 men, intended to outflank Kutuzov’s left—a plan fraught with potential difficulties and yet if successful, possibly decisive. Having insufficient troops to both pin the enemy and execute a wide turn around Kutuzov’s flank may have dissuaded Napoleon from adopting the plan. Whatever the reason, the Emperor, suffering from a heavy cold, failed to display his usual energy and opted for a simple strategy: a massive frontal assault on the Russian center and left-center. Specifically, the main thrust would be directed against the area between Borodino to the north and the flêches to the south, with Prince Poniatowski’s V Corps, on its own, attempting a small flanking movement against the Russian left. This was perhaps the least imaginative and potentially the costliest method of defeating the Russians.

The French were in position by 5:00 A.M. on 7 September, but at sunrise, through some oversight made the previous day, the batteries were found to have been constructed out of range of the Russian line. Once they had been repositioned to within 1,300 yards of the enemy it was precisely 6:00 A.M., at which time 100 guns opened a massive bombardment against Bagration’s positions. The French enjoyed some initial success, as IV Corps (mostly Italians) under Prince Eugène de Beauharnais, operating on the left of the attack, captured Borodino in a rapid assault. Barclay de Tolly’s counterattack managed to retake the village, but finding the place untenable, the general ordered his troops to withdraw across the Kalatsha and burn the bridge behind them.

Meanwhile, two divisions under Davout reached Semenovskaya further south, while at 6:30 the French made their first assault on the flêches, briefly taking one of them. Having lost heavily from artillery fire in the process, however, they soon retreated before a Russian counterattack with bayonets. Davout had his horse shot from under him and was carried off the field semiconscious. On the extreme right, Poniatowki began his efforts at turning the Russian left.He succeeded in capturing Utitsa and part of the woods to the north of the village, aided by the transfer of some of the Russian troops in this sector to the area around the hard-pressed flêches. General Alexander Tuchkov was killed in the seesaw battle around Utitsa, where the Poles, despite gallant efforts, found themselves unable to achieve a breakthrough. Kutuzov reacted accordingly, shifting large numbers of reserves from his as-yet unengaged right wing in order to reinforce his center and left.

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The Battle of Borodino. With both sides evenly matched and Napoleon unimaginatively content to launch his troops straight into the teeth of prepared positions, the battle was destined to be a costly and exhausting stalemate.

Back at the flêches, a Russian grenadier division struggled against overwhelming numbers of attackers until virtually annihilated; like so many Russian units, especially those regiments within easy range of the enemy’s plentiful artillery, they died where they stood, stubbornly refusing to yield ground. The French eventually took two flêches, but before the third could be captured Bagration introduced reinforcements into the fray, which in turn drew in tens of thousands of French troops in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle that involved hundreds of pieces of artillery on both sides. The flêches changed hands several times, and in the course of the fighting Bagration fell wounded, struck in the leg—a wound from which he would die seventeen days later. From Bagration command passed first to General Peter Petrovich Konovnitsyn and then to General Dmitry Dokhturov, and after five hours’ savage, fighting the Russians finally withdrew from the flêches, the place littered with the fallen.

Further north, Eugène and his division crossed the Kalatsha in the direction of the Rayevsky Redoubt but were halted with severe losses. Similarly, Davout’s I Corps, confronting the corps of generals Nikolay Rayevsky, Borodin, and Karl Fiodorovich Baggovut and supported by part of Marshal Ney’s command and all of Marshal Junot’s corps, could not make further headway. After four hours’ fighting, by 10:00 A.M. the battle had degenerated into a massive contest of attrition, with rapidly growing casualties on both sides. Napoleon had long since committed practically all his formations save for the Imperial Guard and the cavalry held in reserve. Subordinates appealed in vain to the Emperor to commit the Imperial Guard to take advantage of the fall of the flêches, but Napoleon refused, perhaps conscious of the fact that it might be needed at a more critical time.

By noon the Russians had partly given way in the center, but they continued to hold the line in other sectors of the field. Kutuzov redeployed General Ivan Osterman-Tolstoy’s IV Corps from the right wing in order to bolster the center and left, while 12,000 Cossacks and regular cavalry under generals Matvei Platov and Fedor Uvarov crossed the Kalatsha to counterattack around Borodino, obliging the French to postpone their planned massive onslaught against the Great Redoubt. Meanwhile, by 2:00 P.M. Eugène had recrossed the Kalatsha to the north bank in order to bolster the troops under attack by Russian cavalry and to ready his three divisions for the great assault. An earlier attack on the redoubt had been repulsed, leaving the French 30th Line virtually destroyed and the commander of the Russian reserve artillery, Kutaisov, dead. Grouchy’s III Cavalry Corps was sent to cut up the Russian infantry in the area, but when they formed square his enterprise failed. After the cavalry returned to friendly lines the artillery bombardment was redoubled, killing thousands in the tightly packed Russian ranks, though the Rayevsky Redoubt remained in Russian possession.

At the same time, on Napoleon’s extreme right, Poniatowski had made little further progress around Utitsa. Having the advantage of woods and broken ground, the defenders held their positions tenaciously, despite the appearance of French reinforcements under Junot.

With no possibility of a breakthrough on either wing, the French could only clinch victory in the center. Situated in the Russian line between the Rayevsky Redoubt and the flêches, Semenovskaya, already burned and virtually demolished, was now utterly destroyed by French artillery fire before two of Ney’s cavalry corps swept in to deliver a potentially decisive blow. At the same time, General Marie-Victor Latour-Maubourg’s IV Cavalry Corps destroyed a Russian grenadier division before it could deploy in square, only to be driven off by counterattacking Russian cavalry behind them. Further south, General Nansouty’s I Cavalry Corps could make no headway against infantry of the Russian Imperial Guard, which had formed squares, while in Semenovskaya itself the grenadiers fought with such tenacity that only Marshal Murat’s presence stopped the French from abandoning the place altogether.

Another French advance ejected the Russians from the burning village once again, and for a short time Kutuzov’s army was actually split in two. A second appeal to Napoleon to throw in the Imperial Guard was made and declined, and with it probably went the last opportunity for a breakthrough. Nor were Murat’s cavalry properly put to use: The bulk of them, having been repulsed from the area around Semenovskaya, sat immobile for hours, receiving no orders to exploit the gap in the Russian line and suffering horrendous losses, including General Montbrun, commander of II Cavalry Corps, who was killed by Russian artillery fire. The Russians filled the gap, and despite the loss of Semenovskaya and the flêches, Kutuzov’s line remained intact, albeit battered.

Meanwhile, Eugène, concentrating every available trooper, attempted to advance further after the fall of the Rayevsky Redoubt in order to exploit his success there, but Barclay de Tolly halted this advance by bringing up two fresh cavalry corps. With no further reserves, the French were simply unable to proceed further.

On the Russian right, Kutuzov now showed some rare initiative, ordering a broad cavalry sweep intended to strike the French rear. Generals Uvarov and Platov, with regular cavalry and Cossacks totaling 8,000 horsemen, advanced with caution, and though they did not attack the French rear, they did manage to cause panic in their ranks and paralyzed thousands of troops who might have been committed to the fray in the center.

The Rayevsky Redoubt, the focus of hours of artillery fire by over 150 guns, remained to be vanquished. Now, at about 3:00 P.M., the French launched a coordinated infantry and cavalry attack against the now-shapeless feature. Napoleon’s aide-de-camp, General Caulaincourt, leading II and IV Cavalry Corps, advanced over the breastworks with the Saxon and Polish heavy cavalry, while French cuirassiers stormed in through the back. Caulaincourt was killed in the charge, but the key to Kutuzov’s line was taken, secured by infantry that stormed through the embrasures in the wake of the cavalry. There followed a fierce two-hour cavalry engagement as French and Allied regiments galloped on into the main Russian line, where Barclay de Tolly twice narrowly escaped death.

On Napoleon’s extreme right, Poniatowski’s Polish troops carried on the struggle and at 4:00 P.M. were able to recapture Utitsa and the knoll on which it stood. However, the appearance of Russian reinforcements—unbeknownst to Poniatowski, they were the Moscow militia, a force of very dubious quality—gave the attackers cause for concern, and the offensive ground to a halt. Indeed, by 5:00 P.M., all along the front the fighting gradually petered out, both sides exhausted from the bloodletting. Large gaps had opened in the Russian line, but Napoleon continued to refuse to send in the Imperial Guard in what might have been a decisive turn of affairs. As the fighting abated, the French stood roughly on the site of the original Russian positions. Still, Kutuzov’s army, shaken though not broken, retired only a short distance away to the next ridge— hardly the outcome that Napoleon had desired.

Both sides were exhausted. Casualties were horrendous. Exact figures are not known, but approximately 44,000 Russians fell at Borodino, of whom perhaps 25,000 were wounded and left on the field. Bagration lay mortally wounded, Tuchkov was dead, and twenty-one other Russian generals were casualties. Some corps were so depleted as to be mistaken for divisions, and divisions for battalions. The French, for their part, held the field, but at a cost of about 33,000 wounded and killed—roughly 40 percent of their original force. Montbrun and Caulaincourt were among the dead, and Davout was wounded. All told, about a dozen générals de division and nearly 200 staff and senior officers were among the fallen. Too weary to pursue, the French withdrew to their original lines and had to content themselves with possession of a battlefield choked with bodies.

Senior commanders on both sides, but particularly the French, had shown little imagination, with massacre the inevitable result of two armies slugging it out on a congested field. Both sides claimed victory, but Borodino may best be described as a draw or, arguably, a technical victory for the French, who, with a clear road ahead of them, staggered into Moscow on 14 September. Nevertheless, Napoleon’s losses had been on such a scale as to render Borodino a Pyrrhic victory. While Kutuzov had certainly lost a considerable proportion of his forces, he could expect reinforcements, whereas the French could not rebuild the units that had been thrust into the cauldron of fire with such lavish disregard for the losses they were bound to suffer. Nor could they easily replenish their expended ammunition. Thus, despite their Herculean efforts on 7 September, the French failed to achieve the decisive outcome they desired, marking Borodino as the climax of the campaign and the beginning of the end of the Grande Armée in Russia.

During the night the shattered Russian army, now reduced by more than a third of its strength, began to withdraw further east in case the French sought to renew the attack on the following day. Leaving thousands of stragglers to catch up as best they could, Kutuzov declared on 13 September that he would not fight the French again before Moscow. Instead, he left the city undefended on the basis that its loss would not spell the defeat of his country. He was right: His army remained intact, Napoleon was not in a position to dictate peace, and Tsar Alexander was resolved to continue the war at least until the French had been driven from Russian soil. Although Kutuzov’s troops could not inflict a decisive blow on the Grande Armée, the coming winter could.

References and further reading Belloc, Hillaire. 1926. Napoleon’s Campaign 1812 and Retreat. New York: Harper. Brett-James Antony. 1966. 1812: Eyewitness Accounts of Napoleon’s Defeat in Russia. New York: Harper. Britten Austin, Paul. 1993. 1812: Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. London: Greenhill. Cate, Curtis. 1985. The War of the Two Emperors: The Duel between Napoleon and Alexander—Russia, 1812. New York: Random House. Caulaincourt, Armand-Augustin-Louis de, duc de Vicence. 1935.With Napoleon in Russia: The Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vincenza. Ed. George Libaire. New York: Grosset and Dunlap. Chandler, David. 1995. The Campaigns of Napoleon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Clausewitz, Carl von. 1992. The Campaign of 1812. London: Greenhill. Duffy, Christopher. 1972. Borodino and the War of 1812. London: Seeley Service. Hereford, George B. 2002. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. London: Empiricus. Hourtoulle, F. G. 2000. Borodino, the Moskova: The Battle for the Redoubts. Paris: Histoire and Collections. Nafziger, George F. 1988. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. Novato, CA: Presidio. Nicolson, Nigel. 1985. Napoleon, 1812. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Palmer, Alan W. 1997. Napoleon in Russia. London: Constable. Riehn, Richard K. 1990. 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign. New York: McGraw-Hill. Ségur, Louis-Philippe, comte de. 1928. The Memoirs and Anecdotes of the Count de Ségur. New York: Scribner. Smith, Digby. 1998. Borodino. Moreton-in-Marsh, UK: Windrush. Zamoyski, Adam. 2004. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. London: HarperCollins.

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General Rayevski bravely leading his men into combat at the battle of Saltanovka.

 

A battle fought between the 2nd (Russian) Western Army and Marshal Nicolas Davout’s forces in the early phase of Napoleon’s advance on Moscow in 1812, Mogilev is also known as the Battle of Saltanovka. As Napoleon’s forces invaded Russia, Prince Peter Bagration’s 2nd Western Army eluded their enveloping maneuvers and hastily retreated eastward to join General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly’s 1st Western Army. Threatened by the forces under Jérôme Bonaparte from the rear and Marshal Louis Davout’s corps from the north, Bagration moved by forced marches toward Mogilev, where he intended to cross the Dnieper River and join Barclay de Tolly.

 

However, Davout beat him to the town, arriving with some 28,000 men on 20 July. The Russians approached Mogilev on the twenty-first, and their advance guard under Colonel Vasily Sysoev engaged Davout’s advance troops near the village of Dashkovka, south of Mogilev. Bagration then decided to attack Davout with only the 7th Infantry Corps under General Nikolay Rayevsky: If Mogilev proved to be held only by Davout’s advance troops, Rayevsky was strong enough to drive them out, move to Orsha, and cover the route to Smolensk. However, if Davout were there in force, Rayevsky was to fight a delaying action to keep the French on the right bank of the Dnieper, while Bagration crossed the river with the army to the south of Mogilev.

 

Davout’s forces, reduced by fatigue from marching, were still further weakened by the strategic situation. The effective forces at his command to oppose Bagration’s army amounted to only 22,000 infantry and some 6,000 cavalry. Taking into account the numerical superiority of the Russians, Davout positioned his troops at Saltanovka. His left was deployed on the marshy bank of the Dnieper and was unassailable. A stream flowing in a difficult ravine, spanned from the village of Saltanovka by a wooden bridge, covered his front. Dense forest surrounded the village, especially on the northern bank of the stream.

 

Davout reinforced these positions with additional earthworks. His soldiers cut the bridge at Fatova, fortified the buildings on the high road, and established strong batteries there. Davout deployed five battalions of the 108th Line and one battalion of the 85th Line here. Behind them he placed four battalions of the 61st Line in reserve between Fatova and Selets. On the left wing, at Saltanovka, Davout arranged three battalions of the 85th Line and an independent company of voltigeurs (light infantry operating as skirmishers). Finally, he deployed battalions of the 85th and 61st Line, respectively, and several cavalry units.

 

Around 7:00 A.M. on 23 July the advance guard (6th and 42nd Jägers) of the Russian 7th Corps led the attack on Davout’s left wing at Saltanovka. Pushing the French outposts back, it reached the bridge over the Saltanovka stream at 8:00 A.M. Despite the fierce fire, the Jägers under the command of Colonel Andrey Glebov overran the defenders on the bridge and continued their advance. Davout immediately counterattacked with the 85th Line. The Russian advance was halted by heavy artillery fire and musketry, but their infantry then stood stoically for several minutes, allowing themselves to be shot down rather than yield ground. Rayevsky then launched almost simultaneous assaults on the French positions at Saltanovka and Fatova.

 

The 26th Infantry Division under General Ivan Paskevich was ordered to march on a narrow path through a forest to attack the French; this maneuver would serve as a signal for the main forces of 7th Corps to attack. Paskevich deployed his division in extended column and attacked the village. In fierce fighting the Russians overran the 1st battalion of the 85th Line, forcing its retreat. To support the 85th Line, Davout sent a battalion of the 108th Line with a few guns. Both French battalions took up a position on the heights to the south of Fatova and repulsed the Russian attack. Paskevich rallied his troops on the edge of the forest and, supported by a 12-gun battery, launched another attack that carried the village. However, after passing Fatova, the advancing Russian battalions were suddenly counterattacked by four battalions of the 108th Line, concealed by Davout in the wheat fields behind the village. The French inflicted heavy casualties on the Russians and forced their retreat.

 

Despite this setback, Paskevich rallied his troops and counterattacked. At first the attack was successful and he captured the village again. Davout, however, moved the 61st Line to strengthen his defenses. The French repulsed the Russian attack and drove them back; on the right flank, two French battalions overwhelmed the Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod regiments and crossed the brook. Paskevich was compelled to move the Poltava Regiment to contain the French advance and prevent the Russian right wing from being turned. Meanwhile, the main effort of 7th Corps was focused on Saltanovka. Rayevsky led the Smolensk Infantry Regiment to seize a dam and cover the approach of the main forces. This column was to be supported by the 6th and 42nd Jäger regiments and artillery deployed on the heights on both sides of the road. It was agreed that the attack would be launched simultaneously with Paskevich’s advance on Fatova.

 

Yet, Rayevsky did not hear the cannon shots that signaled the advance, and so his attack started too late. Russian units endured devastating artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties. At one point, seeing the confusion in his troops, Rayevsky held the hands of his two sons, Alexander (sixteen) and Nikolay (ten), and, yelling “Hurrah!” led the attack. Notwithstanding this inspiration, the charge was repulsed. Learning from prisoners that Davout had gathered reinforcements, Rayevsky ordered a general retreat and withdrew his troops to Dashkovka.

 

Following the engagement at Mogilev, the 2nd Western Army completed construction of a bridge at Novy Bikhov and crossed the river toward Smolensk. The Russians acknowledged 2,548 killed and wounded in the battle and claimed the French lost 4,134 dead and wounded. Although Davout admitted to only 900 casualties, the French losses were close to 1,200. Mogilev is often acknowledged as a French victory, though in reality Bagration achieved his goal of eluding the French envelopment and breaking through to Smolensk, where the Russian armies united.

 

References and further reading Afanas’ev, A. 1992. 1812–1814: Lichnaia perepiska Nikolaia Rayevskogo. Moscow: Terra. Davout, Louis Nicolas. 1885. Correspondance du maréchal Davout, prince d’Eckmühl, ses commandements, son ministère, 1801–1815. Paris: Plon, Nourrit. Gallaher, John. 1976. The Iron Marshal: A Biography of Louis N. Davout. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Girod de l’Ain, Felix Jean. 1873. Dix ans de mes Souvenirs militaires (de 1805 à 1815). Paris: N.p. Inostrantsev. 1914. Otechestvennaya voina 1812 goda, Operatsii 2-oi Zapadnoi armii kniazya Bagrationa ot nachala voini do Smolenska. St. Petersburg: N.p. Kharkevich,V. 1901. Voina 1812 goda. Ot Nemana do Smolenska. Vilna: Izd. Nikolaevskoi akademii general’nago shtaba. Mikaberidze, Alexander. 2003. “Lion of the Russian Army: The Life and Military Career of General Prince Bagration.” Ph.D. diss., Florida State University.

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The apparent malaise that settled upon American arms in the second half of 1778 prevailed through the first half of 1779, until Washington decided on a response to Clinton. Persuaded by the exiled renegade congressman Joseph Galloway and Gen. James Robertson that Loyalists actually composed the majorities in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the North ministry decided on a new strategy. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton received orders from Lord George Germain to push Washington into the upper Hudson Highlands and to isolate New York from the other colonies as a bastion of Loyalist power and royal governance and a base for extending similar campaigns into the Middle Colonies. Germain believed the task would require 29,000 troops; as Clinton had only 22,000, he would be sent 1,000 from Halifax and the remainder from England.

At the end of May, Clinton assembled 6,000 crack British and Hessian troops at Spuyten Duyvil; they embarked aboard 70 sailing vessels and 150 flat-bottomed boats to move up the Hudson River and attack Washington’s army headquartered at West Point. The British quickly captured the American posts at Stony Point and Fort Lafayette on both sides of the river 12 miles below West Point. In July, Clinton sent a force of 2,600 troops out of Whitestone, New York, to raid Connecticut in order to shut off supplies to the Continental army from that source and to end harassment of British shipping. This force successfully raided New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk.

 

As the Connecticut raids proceeded, General Washington and Gen. Anthony Wayne personally reconnoitered Stony Point and planned an assault on the fort. They received detailed observations on the status of the fortifications from Capt. Allen McLane, Maj. Henry Lee’s scout, who obtained entry to the fort through a ruse. And they sent McLane with a few other soldiers to monitor from hiding the daily routine at the fort. Wayne also had the assistance of a slave, Pompey Lamb, a Patriot spy who delivered fruits and vegetables to the fort and arranged for a nighttime delivery—the password given to him by the British would facilitate access by Wayne’s men after the British guards opened the gate for Lamb’s entry. (His effort earned Lamb freedom and a horse in payment.) During the night of July 15, General Wayne assembled 1,350 Continentals at Donderberg. He revealed to his colonels the true purpose of their mission. He ordered his troops to place white slips of paper in their hats for identification in the dark, explained their duties in detail, stressed that none might carry a loaded weapon except the men he designated, insisted on absolute obedience, and specified that no one remove his musket from his shoulder under threat of death—anyone who retreated or hesitated would be shot by the nearest officer. As a positive incentive, Wayne offered cash prizes beginning at $500 to the first five men to enter the fort at Stony Point.

Wayne divided his men into two main columns to attack from the right and the left, with a third unit to assault the center. He chose 150 men to lead the right column and wield axes against the two lines of British abatis, freeing the way for the right column, accompanied by Wayne, to rush into the fort. In the early hours of July 16, the Continentals crossed a marsh and a sandbar leading to the fort and, in a perilous and courageous charge, surged into the fort under protective fire from their left—only Maj. Hardy Murfree’s men in this column had loaded weapons. The fort’s commandant, Col. Henry Johnson, led some of the 625 defenders to confront Murfree; the Americans’ right column, led by Wayne and Lt. Col. Christian Febiger, stormed across the outer abatis before Johnson realized what was occurring and his men went out of control. Wayne, his head grazed by a bullet, fell at the second abatis but had two officers hoist and carry him up the hill. A bullet tore through Febiger’s nose and cheek, but with blood spurting into his mouth he persisted. Francis McDonald, with the American left column, climbed on a comrade’s shoulders, hoisted himself over a parapet, and dropped into the midst of the British. He unbolted the heavy gate, and the Continentals swarmed inside. They captured the summit and raised the flag with triumphant shouts. Realizing his defenses had failed, Johnson surrendered. The overwhelmed British garrison numbered 63 dead and 70 wounded and 543 taken prisoner, while Wayne’s force suffered 15 dead and 80 wounded. Wayne’s totally unexpected and stunning victory forced Clinton to cancel the Connecticut raids and assemble all available men-of-war to sail upriver and recapture the fort. Wayne destroyed and abandoned the fort, leaving it for Clinton to reoccupy and rebuild. The two winners of the prize money as first inside the fort donated the money to the enlisted men. Wayne’s triumph at Stony Point demoralized Clinton but propelled a leap in morale among the Continentals.

 

Stony Point proved the highwater mark of the year for the war in the North, which settled into near stasis, except for Maj. Henry (Light Horse Harry) Lee’s surprising but temporary triumph at Paulus Hook in August. Inspired by Wayne’s triumph at Stony Point, Lee persuaded Washington to let him attack the garrison of 200 British troops and 40 Hessians on this peninsula in the Hudson across from New York City. Capt. Allen McLane’s talents were again used to scout the redoubt. In the early morning of August 19, Lee’s men waded across the marshes, their splashes alerting the defenders; but Lee’s “suicide squad” of axmen succeeded in destroying the British abatis nevertheless. The Americans raced ahead to capture a blockhouse in a quick triumph effected without firing a single shot, while bayoneting 50 of the garrison and taking 158 prisoners. But commander Maj. William Sutherland and some 40 Hessians barricaded themselves in another blockhouse and refused to surrender. Since the huge British garrison in New York had already received an alarm, Lee had no choice but withdrawal—leaving the barracks and cannons intact and taking no booty. He headed for Douwe’s Ferry with his men and prisoners. The triumphant Americans had only two dead and three wounded, and Lee’s lightning victory gave another boost to the Continentals’ morale.

The ferocious battle at Shiloh on April 6–7, almost a full year after the outbreak of hostilities, showed once again that basic problems of organizational competence remained more important than abstract questions of strategy or social organization. The troops at Shiloh had obvious deficiencies in equipment, organization, and training, despite the fact that a full year had passed since the outbreak of hostilities. For example, the 15th and 16th Iowa had not even mastered the manual of arms. One Confederate battery had not yet fired a shot. What little training the Confederate artillery had it owed –unsurprisingly–to a West Pointer, Maj. Francis A. Shoup. It was not until after the Shiloh campaign at the Confederate encampment in Tupelo that the Army of Tennessee’s artillery would receive extensive training to supplement the inadequate preparations of the previous fall. Despite the presence of some Enfields, much of the Confederate army was equipped with a hodgepodge of squirrel guns, shotguns, and outdated smoothbore muskets. The Federals, however, did not have any noticeable superiority in their own small arms. Before the battle, Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg had bluntly described his six brigades as “the mob we have, miscalled soldiers.” Ironically enough, Bragg’s troops may have been the best drilled in a raw army about to go on the offensive.

 

Extremely poor fire discipline remained a continuing problem with green troops. Soldiers frequently saw firing as a form of emotional release from the extreme strain of battle; for example, one Iowan at Shiloh, Warren Olney, reported his unit firing smoothbore volleys without orders at a totally ineffective range of three hundred to four hundred yards: “But though our action was absurd, it was a relief to us to do something.” Drill was supposed to help with the problem; to wit, the colonel of the 32nd Indiana had to use the expedient of ordering his troops to go through the manual of arms in order to steady them after they prematurely opened fire at too great a distance. Brig. Gen. John Logan, one of the best Union officers drawn from civil life, sounded almost like a regular in his constant exhortations to his men to fire only under orders and to make sure to aim their fire at an actual Confederate.

 

Nevertheless, one soldier at Shiloh, commenting on some of his comrades, remembered that “we were ordered to fire, and as soon as I let go of Ned’s gun, he stuck it up in the air, shut both his eyes, and fired at the tree tops, and Schnider did the same. But Schnider was in rear rank behind Curly and he cut a lock of Curly’s hair off just above his ear, and burned his neck.” The same soldier’s later comment that “it is very trying to one’s nerves to lay under fire and not be able to do anything in return” serves as good an explanation as any for the emotional release some men found in discharging their weapons. One Confederate officer bluntly complained that “stragglers would fall from their own lines and, retiring under cover of another line, fire recklessly to the front.” The historian Andrew Haughton even cites a report of actual fratricides from rear-rank men in the Confederate army. Civil War armies would struggle for years with the problem of soldiers continually loading their weapons without actually firing them.

 

Basic problems with discipline also included a propensity to pillage. Initial success demoralized many of the Confederate troops at Shiloh in the same way Grant’s troops had lost discipline at the battle of Belmont the previous November; they simply could not resist the opportunity to pillage the captured Federal camp. One Confederate officer had harsh words for the short-term Confederate volunteers, declaring that “the disorders resulting from want of proper discipline were numberless; the most fatal to the consummation of a success so gallantly begun being the lawless spirit of plunder and pillage so recklessly indulged in.” Even veteran troops would have been subject to the simple exhaustion and inevitable disorganization that the first day of fighting produced in the Confederate army, but breaking ranks to pillage enemy camps before the day was truly won represented a level of demoralization over and above being fought out.

 

Both army commands also had their own defects. Grant and Sherman at the very least could have prepared themselves better for the attack, although in their defense, Grant’s rationale against entrenching so that the raw troops could focus on drill had a certain plausibility to it. Furthermore, the ever-pugnacious C. F. Smith, reflecting the same aggressive school of thought that had made his bayonet charge at Donelson successful, believed that entrenchments would enervate the troops. Indeed, even after the war, John Bell Hood argued that “a soldier cannot fight for a period of one or two months constantly behind breastworks … and then be expected to engage in pitched battle and prove as intrepid and impetuous as his brother who has been taught to rely solely upon his own valor.” On the Confederate side, Johnston and Beauregard have received some critical appraisals by modern scholars for their battlefield performance. The Creole has drawn fire for a muddled battle plan, and historians have criticized Johnston for neglecting his overall responsibilities as army commander. In fact, Beauregard learned nothing from First Manassas, because his plans at Shiloh were also far too complicated and “Napoleonic” for their own good. Confederate staff work for the march on Pittsburgh’s Landing also proved of dubious quality.

 

Nevertheless, some officers knew and understood tactics well enough to even use assault columns by division—columns with a two-company front commonly used in Napoleonic practice. The 32nd Indiana managed to make a charge while in column by division and then take advantage of its breaking foes by deploying into line and opening fire on the fleeing Confederates. Later in the day, it deployed four companies as skirmishers as opposed to the usual two but retained the column, in an interesting mix of firepower and shock. This early use of light-infantry methods at Shiloh also showed that such tactics did not require the universal use of the rifle-musket, which was not possible at this stage in the indifferently armed armies of the western theater. On occasion, whole regiments deployed as skirmishers. Sharpshooters even picked off artillerists with aimed fire. The commander of the sharpshooters from the second brigade of Union Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace’s division used a swell in the ground to snipe at an artillery battery during one assault. Furthermore, Shiloh also saw at least some deliberate sniping at field officers. Although it did not replace the primacy of the battle line, sharpshooting seemed to have had at least some effect on the battle.

The château of Hougoumont, which included woods, farm buildings, and a garden. Wellington recognized the tactical importance of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, and placed strong garrisons in each. These strongpoints presented obstacles to a French attack on the Allied right and center, and could offer enfilading fire to any opposing troops that sought to bypass them. Hougoumont was large enough, moreover, to make a sweep around Wellington’s right more difficult, though not impossible.

Coldstream Guards at Hougoumont, a fortified farm which became the focus of some of the bloodiest fighting at Waterloo. This vital strongpoint in the Allied line nearly fell when axe-wielding French infantry broke open the great north door, allowing a handful of men to enter the courtyard. Colonel Macdonnell, sword in hand, along with four other Coldstreamers, just managed to close the gate, an action which Wellington later claimed had been essential to success that day.

The initial diversionary bombardment and attack finally began at 11:50 A.M., from the extreme French left flank against Hougoumont Farm, a general sporadic firing developing all along the French front by noon. Today, as on the sixteenth, Napoleon’s poor choice of commanders, including Ney, Grouchy and his own brother, Prince Jerome, was again to have dire results for him.

 

Heading the diversion, Jerome’s orders were to draw as much of Wellington’s powerful center to the extreme left as possible, preparatory to the major offensive planned for one o’clock. Encountering very stiff resistance from the Nassauers and Hanoverians around Hougoumont Farm and the British guards within that farm, however, Jerome fell into his own trap, recklessly throwing in all four of his regiments, only to be repulsed each time. Then in desperation he finally forced Foy to part with as much as half his own division to satisfy Jerome’s ego in taking what was denied him. Foy protested vigorously but to no avail. After all, Jerome was the Emperor’s brother. Meanwhile, Hougoumont was reinforced lightly by the Coldstream Guards and the Scots Guards, who continued to repulse everything thrown at them, despite a heavier commitment by Reille. In fact, Reille should have ordered the reckless young Bonaparte back, instead of jeopardizing Napoleon’s entire operations, but apparently he was too afraid of the Emperor to chance that. Indeed, any good commander would have attacked Hougoumont with howitzers first before committing troops as mere cannon fodder, as Bonaparte was doing. Prince Jerome, however, obstinately hammered against the stone and brick walls of Hougoumont with human flesh and of course the casualties mounted and mounted.

 

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By 7 P.M. Prince Jerome was still vainly laying siege to the redoubtable Hougoumont Farm along the Allied right, while Donzelot’s, Quiot’s and Marcognet’s divisions were in control as far as Papelotte and La Haie to the Allied left, Blucher temporarily thrown back. Although the sun broke through at long last, promising light for another two hours, Napoleon’s situation was still desperate as further Prussian reinforcements continued to come up. In fact, once again he found himself faced with two options: a rapid strategic withdrawal in an attempt to salvage his army and regroup, or . . . he could attack and pray that Grouchy arrived in time.

 

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Finally, as for his professional views on that day’s fighting, the Duke drily observed: “Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all; he just moved forward in the old style in columns, and was driven off in the old style.” And while admitting that Bonaparte “never had so fine an army as at Waterloo,” he equally declared that he himself “never saw the British infantry behave so well,” firmly believing that they had “given Napoleon his death blow,” as he put it. “Our battle . . . was one of giants: and our success was most complete” he afterward reported to Prinz Schwarzenberg; “God grant I may never see another!”

 

Project Hougoumont

Hasan Pasha, the Ottoman military Governor of Bosnia, raiding into Croatia found himself facing a large Imperial force led by Michael of Wallachia and Sigismund Bathory of Transylvania outside Sissek, on the Kupa and Save Rivers. Hasan was killed in a terrible defeat. Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha was later sent to avenge the loss and in October he laid siege to Veszprem (20 June 1593).

 

The inconclusive, unpredictable, and expensive nature of large campaigns, low-level border conflicts and raids (kleinkrieg) gained importance and became the essential part of the battle environment and lifestyle of the Ottoman- Habsburg frontier after the long reign of Süleyman. This situation was exaggerated by frontier populations, which consisted of thousands of mercenaries who sought employment through war. Within certain limits both sides tolerated these raids and conflicts within. Occasionally, events spiraled out of control, however, provoking large campaigns. The Long War (Langekrieg) of 1593 to 1606 was a good example of this type of escalation. In 1592, the governor of Bosnia, Telli Hasan Pasha, increased the level of raids and began to conduct medium-sized attacks against specific targets by using his provincial units only, although he probably had the tacit support of some high-ranking government officials. Initially, he achieved a series of successes but suffered a decisive defeat near Sissek in which nearly all his army was wiped out and he himself was killed. The new Grand Vizier, Koca Sinan Pasha, used this incident as well as a popular mood inclined toward war to break the long peace.

 

In spring 1593, without a declaration of war, the Governor-General of Bosnia, Hasan Pasha, with his provincial army crossed the Kupa River, then the border between Ottomans and Austria as agreed upon in a treaty concluded between Habsburg and the High Porte at Adrianople (present day: Edirne) only a year earlier.

 

According to historic tradition the Ottoman forces that attempted to take Sisak fortress were six times superior in numbers, although three times is probably closer to reality. In any case, it was a local, provincial army and their contingent of elite troops must have been but small. Pounding the massed attackers with heavy artillery fire, the Austrian, Carniolan and Croat defenders broke the Ottoman siege and pushed the enemy towards the Kupa river. Caught in the middle between two Christian army flanks, the attackers panicked and started a chaotic retreat. Disintegrating under the unending cannonade, the bulk of the army with all the commanders are said to have drowned in the Kupa river.

 

The commander-in-chief of the Ottoman force, Hasan Pasha, did not survive the battle. The figures concerning the Ottoman losses vary from 8,000 to a bragging and vainglorious 20,000, as legend has it, which contrasts sharply with one author’s statement that there was only a total of 12,000 Ottoman troops involved who faced 5,000 Croats reinforced by forces from Styria and Carniola. Christian losses are said to have numbered only between 40-50 men.

 

Christian Europe, which after relieving Spain of the Arabic Muslims had identified the Ottoman Empire with the Islamic menace, was delighted at the reports of such an allegedly grandiose victory. King Philip II of Spain congratulated and Pope Clement VIII praised the Christian military leaders. The traditional daily ringing of the small bell of Zagreb cathedral at 2 p.m. is in memory of the battle as it was the bishop of Zagreb who had born the major part of the costs of the fortress of Sisak.

 

When Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II (1552–1612) unilaterally terminated tribute payments to the Ottoman Empire for possession of Austrian Hungary in 1591, threats were issued and skirmishing broke out, but the Ottomans actually lost ground in central Hungary and Romania. War began in earnest in 1594 when Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha (d. 1596) led 100,000 troops into northern Hungary. The following year on October 28, 1595, Sigismund Báthory (1557–1606), prince of Transylvania, led Austro-Hungarian forces against the invaders at Guirgevo. Sinan was defeated.

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In September 1596 the new sultan, Mohammed III (d. 1603), renewed the invasion, again with 100,000 men. They targeted the fortress town of Erlau. The massive force succeeded in taking the town, whereupon a force of 40,000, including Austrians, Germans, Transylvanians, and Hungarians, advanced to regain it. Twice the Ottomans sent forces to intercept the advance, and twice, on October 24 and October 26, 1596, they were repulsed. Then the Hapsburg forces counterattacked, penetrating the camp of the sultan and capturing some 50 artillery pieces. However, the Ottomans replied with a devastating surprise cavalry attack on the German-Hungarian flank. This was sufficient to create panic in the entire force, and the Hapsburgs lost some 23,000 men. Ottoman losses were also heavy—probably 20,000 killed or wounded— and the army was in such a state of exhaustion that it did not capitalize on its victory. The result was that warfare within the Ottoman-Hungarian borderlands continued sporadically until 1606, when, on November 11, the Treaty of Zsitva-Torok ended hostilities.

Forces Engaged

Roman: 34,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. Commander: Publius Cornelius Scipio.

Carthaginian: 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Commander: Hannibal Barca.

Importance

Roman victory brought an end to the Second Punic War and made Rome the dominant power in the western Mediterranean while severely weakening Carthage.

Historical Setting

In 218 b.c., the Second Punic War had just gotten under way. Hannibal Barca, Carthaginian commander in Spain, had challenged Roman power in 219 b.c. by laying siege to the city of Saguntum. According to the treaty concluded at the end of the First Punic War, the city lay within a region recognized as under Carthage’s suzerainty, but the fact that Saguntum had a pro-Roman government brought a Roman declaration of war. Hannibal responded by capturing the city and then staging a brilliant forced march through the Pyrenees, southern Gaul (France), and through the Alps into northern Italy.

 

Hannibal’s arrival in the Po River valley forced the Roman government to cancel its original plan to land forces in Spain. Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio sailed to Massilia (Marseilles), but failed to catch Hannibal in time, so then marched down the coast into Italy to fight the invader. Meanwhile, his brother, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, sailed to Spain, landed in nominally Roman territory north of the Ebro River, and secured the region by defeating Hanno, one of Hannibal’s brothers. Having little luck against Hannibal in Italy, Publius Scipio was later transferred to Spain to aid his brother. They campaigned in central Spain but were defeated and killed in 211 by another of Hannibal’s brothers, Hasdrubal. The Roman Senate, desperate for a general who could score some victories, in 210 b.c. named Publius Cornelius Scipio to command in Spain. This was the son of the Publius killed the previous year. Although only 25 years old, he commanded instant respect and launched a military career that never knew defeat.

 

In 209, Scipio went into action north of the Ebro, securing again for Spain the land between that river and the Pyrenees. Then, in a bold move bordering on rashness, he sailed down the east coast of Spain with more than 27,000 men and attacked and captured the Carthaginian capital of Spain, New Carthage (Cartagena). This placed him in a position to threaten the lines of communication of Carthage’s army in Spain, and Hasdrubal marched to face the danger. At Baecula in 208, the two armies fought an inconclusive battle; Hasdrubal withdrew north and crossed into Italy along the same route his brother had taken 10 years earlier. Scipio did not pursue, instead searching out the remaining Carthaginian forces in Spain under Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco. He defeated them in 206 at the battle of Ilipa, where his army of 48,000 crushed an enemy force of 70,000.

 

Scipio was at this point master of Spain and, with Hasdrubal Barca’s defeat at the Metauraus River, Hannibal was isolated in Italy. Planning to use Spain as his base to invade North Africa, Scipio secretly traveled to Numidia (Tunisia) to deal with the two primary Numidian leaders, Syphax and Massinissa. Scipio entered into an alliance with the latter, whereas the former sided with Carthage. Scipio was invited by the Senate to return to Rome to receive his honors for his victories and to retire, but he was intent on taking the war to Carthage. Older senators and military leaders, jealous of his youth and success, instead granted him command of Sicily. Rome had dominated the bulk of the island since the end of the First Punic War, except for the kingdom of Syracuse. When Syracuse allied with Carthage in the Second Punic War in 213 b.c., the Roman general Marcellus laid siege for 2 years before finally overcoming the city’s defenses. Placing Scipio in charge was more an exile than a reward because the troops occupying the island were veterans of Roman defeats at Hannibal’s hands. Undaunted, Scipio began retraining the beaten troops while recruiting new soldiers, and in 204 he was prepared to sail for Africa whether the Senate liked it or not.

 

The Battle

Because Rome had command of the sea, Scipio in 204 b.c. easily was able to transport 30,000 men across the Mediterranean to North Africa and lay siege to the city of Utica (in modern Tunisia). He had to abandon the siege, however, at the approach of a Carthaginian force under Hasdrubal Gisco and the Numidian leader Syphax. Near the coast, Scipio established a fortified camp, which seemed too isolated to hold for long. Hasdrubal therefore offered Scipio peace terms, which the Roman seemed eager to negotiate. In fact, he was lulling his enemies into a false sense of security; as he was talking with them, he was planning a surprise attack on their camps. In the darkness, Scipio attacked Hasdrubal’s camp while his Numidian ally Massinissa attacked Syphax’s camp. The results were devastating for the Carthaginians. The encampments were set afire and reportedly 40,000 men were killed by the flames or while escaping them, with another 5,000 men taken prisoner. The Carthaginian commanders escaped, but left behind virtually their entire army. Scipio proceeded to reinvest Utica.

 

The government of Carthage was so shocked by this development that they ordered Hannibal, after 16 years of campaigning in Italy, to return home. This accomplished the first of Scipio’s goals: to take the war out of his homeland. Hannibal complied with his orders and embarked his 15,000 to 20,000 men for the voyage home on 23 June 203 b.c. With their most successful commander at hand, the Carthaginians gained heart and rejected Scipio’s rather generous peace terms. Outraged at this response, Scipio marched up the coast toward Carthage, burning every village along the way. At that, the rulers of Carthage urged Hannibal into action. He did not want to fight because his soldiers were either veterans exhausted from their long Italian campaign or raw recruits with little training or ability. Knowing also that Scipio’s force far outclassed his in cavalry, Hannibal marched out of Carthage, but contacted Scipio about negotiating. The two met at Zama, about 5 miles southwest of Carthage, and Hannibal offered Rome everything outside of Africa, but Scipio refused; after all, he reasoned, how could he trust Carthaginian promises?

 

Hannibal returned to his camp and prepared for battle. He deployed his men in three parallel lines: in front were the Gauls, both from southern France and from Liguria in northern Italy; in the second line he placed his weakest troops, the newly recruited Carthaginians and others from area tribes; in the rear he placed his most trusted veterans. Carthaginian cavalry was deployed on his right flank, with Numidian cavalry under Syphax on his left. Across his entire front he ranged his elephants. In total, he had approximately 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.

 

Scipio faced him with his 34,000 infantry in three lines as well, but out of the usual Roman formation. The Roman army was organized into maniples, or companies, numbering between 120 and 180 men. They normally deployed in a checkerboard fashion, but Scipio on this day paced them in columns. In front he placed his hastati, the youngest veterans. In the line of maniples behind them, he placed his principes, veterans about 30 years old with more combat experience. In the rear line he placed his triarii, the oldest and most steady of the veterans. In the spaces between the columns of maniples he placed his velites, the youngest soldiers armed as light infantry. Scipio ranged his maniples in columns to allow paths for the charging elephants to pass through. Like Hannibal, he flanked his army with cavalry, of which he had about 9,000: Massinissa led his Numidian cavalry on the Roman right flank opposite Hannibal’s Numidians, while Laelius commanded the Roman cavalry on the left.

 

Hannibal opened the battle by sending his elephants forward. Those on the left wing panicked at the sounds of Roman trumpets, however, and turned back into the Numidian cavalry, which threw a fright into their horses and disorganized them. Massinissa did not hesitate, but threw his cavalry into the melee and pursued the Numidian cavalry off the battlefield. Laelius quickly followed suit, charging into the untrained Carthaginian cavalry; they too broke, and the Roman cavalry was in hot pursuit on their end of the battlefield.

 

The infantry of both armies, which had stood fast during all this confusion, now began to advance toward each other. Hannibal’s superior numbers should have won in the battle, which soon degenerated into a series of single combats, but his first line fought it out alone because the second line refused for some reason to advance in support. Believing themselves abandoned, the Carthaginians turned and fled toward the rear, but the second line refused to let them pass. The result was a fight among Carthaginians as the young hastati veterans pressed down on them. When the principes moved forward to support their first line, both the Carthaginian lines then broke into retreat into the third line, which also refused to let them through. All of this resulted in a massive number of dead and wounded as well as incredible confusion on the Carthaginian side. With the oldest veteran triarii advancing and joining the assault, the relatively well organized Romans were able to launch a coordinated attack on their foe. The solid Carthaginian third line stood and fought well, but they were badly outnumbered by this time.

 

Still, the battle seemed in doubt as Hannibal’s infantry matched the quality of fighting of the Romans. The death blow, however, came from behind. Having given up their respective pursuits, both the Roman and Numidian cavalries returned to the battle and struck the Carthaginian rear. This proved too much, and the Romans began a slaughter. For a loss of 1,500 men killed and probably about 4,000 wounded, the Romans killed 20,000 Carthaginians and captured another 15,000. Hannibal, accompanied by a handful of retainers, fled.

 

Results

Scipio decided against laying Carthage under siege. It was a massive and well-situated city on the end of a strongly fortified peninsula. He lacked the siege engines he would need and the necessary supplies. Further, fearing he would be recalled to Rome before the siege was finished, Scipio decided against allowing anyone else to take the credit for capturing the city. He also felt that it was the Roman way to offer generous terms. He demanded (1) that Carthage hand over all but ten of its warships and all the elephants; (2) that Carthage fight no war against anyone without Roman approval; (3) recognition of Massinissa as king of Numidia; and (4) an indemnity of 10,000 silver talents (approximately 500,000 pounds). This was fairly lenient, considering that Rome could have annexed all of Carthage’s merchant fleet and, with it, access to its markets.

 

Hannibal, in spite of his defeat at Zama, was elected to lead the new Carthaginian government. Under his wise leadership, Carthage paid off its indemnity early and rebounded strongly from the very long war. He provoked Roman jealousy, however, and he spent the rest of his life after 196 b.c. in the courts of various kings as military advisor before finally committing suicide rather than fall into Roman hands. Hannibal’s campaign in Italy has long been recognized as one of the genuine masterpieces of military history, but in the end he was a victim of his own success. Scipio, on the other hand, was ultimately surnamed Africanus for his victory over Hannibal. The meeting of these two generals marked one of those rare occasions in warfare when the best military minds of an era face each other. Probably not until Wellington faced Napoleon at Waterloo was there another such monumental encounter.

 

Peace between the two powers lasted 50 years, but, when Massinissa demanded too much territory at Carthage’s expense, he provoked an invasion in 151 b.c. Because this was undertaken without Rome’s consent, the Roman government went to war. The Carthaginians immediately announced their willingness to stop fighting, but would not abandon their capital city. After a 3-year siege, Carthage finally fell to Roman forces in 146 b.c. The city was razed, and Utica became the provincial capital of the survivors, who came under the direct rule of Rome. Roman control over this region guaranteed grain supplies for the empire for centuries to come.

 

The Roman victory at Zama catapulted the victors from a regional to an international power. Already enlarged by the acquisition of Spain, Roman control over Sicily, northern Italy (Cisalpine Gual), Corsica, and Sardinia meant that the entire western Mediterranean was under its direct or indirect control. Although this was an empire in fact, not until Caesar Augustus came to rule in Rome in 31 b.c. was it formally recognized as such. This political and economic dominance was further solidified in 168 b.c. with the Roman victory over Macedonia at Pydna. That victory placed virtually the entire Mediterranean under Rome’s sway. All that the Roman Empire became was launched at Zama. Had Hannibal won the day, Carthage would probably have continued the war. Although the Carthaginian government was always niggardly in its support of Hannibal during his time in Italy, had he returned to Italy with a victorious army, the capture of the city of Rome was not beyond the realm of possibility. Whether a Carthaginian Empire in Europe would have resulted is problematic, but it certainly would have made sure that Spain was returned to its control. That may have set up an interesting rivalry over Gaul, and the future of western Europe may have had Phoenician roots from Carthage rather than Latin and Greek influence from Rome.

 

References:

Fuller, J. F. C. A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954; Liddell Hart, Basil. A Greater Than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus. New York: Biblo & Tannen, 1971 [1927]; Livy. The War with Hannibal. Translated by Aubrey de Selincourt. Baltimore: Penguin, 1965; Morris, William. Hannibal: Soldier, Statesman, Patriot. New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1978; Polybius. The Histories. Translated by W.R. Paton. New York: Putnam, 1922–1927.

Palestine had passed from the Egypt-based Ptolemaic rule to that of the Syrian-oriented Seleucids after Antiochus III was first checked at battle of Raphia in 217 B.C., but then succeeded against his Egyptian foe at Panion in 198 B.C. Antiochus III’s triumph in Palestine was to be short-lived, however, for his ambitions in Greece crossed the Roman dare-line. The Romans thrashed the Syrian monarch in Thrace in two land battles and a naval campaign at Corycus that served notice that the Romans were now a factor to be considered on water as well as land.

 

A client of Rome, Ptolemy V Epiphanes assumed the throne of Ptolemaic Egypt in 205 BC at the tender age of 5, only to see his dominion wracked by civil war and reduced by the invading armies of Antiochus III of Persian and Philip V of Macedonia, who had plotted a secret alliance to divide the Ptolemaic kingdom between them. In 201 BC, an attempt by Antiochus to seize Palestine and Gaza was rebuffed by the Ptolemaic army. In 200 BC, Antiochus again struck out from Syria with an army of invasion. The Ptolemiac army under Scopas (Skopes) marched north to block their route at the head of the Jordan valley. But Antiochus had already reached the high ground at Mt. Hermon and made his camp there to await the Ptolemiac approach.

Forcing the battle, Scopas advanced from the south with the Wadi Bani’as on his right flank, with his pike phalanxes in the center and his cavalry on the left. The Seleucids advanced aggressively to meet them, crossing the Wadi with their pikes in the lead and elephants in support. As the armies closed, Antiochos the Younger led the Seleucid cavalry down from the slopes of Mt. Hermon to fall on Scopas’s left flank, driving away the Ptolemiac horse.

 

In the infantry battle, Scopas’ pike phalanxes were driving the Seleucid pike back, only to be brought up short by the Seleucid elephants. Meanwhile, Antiochus the Younger directed his cavalry back into the fray, falling on Scopas’ center phalanx from the rear and destroying it. With his left and center gone, Scopas lead his 10,000 survivors south to Sidon, where they were subsequently besieged until famine forced their surrender. Ptolemy V conceded control of Coel-Syria and Palestine, marrying Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus, in order to seal the peace.

 

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